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The Common Law of Cyber-Trespass
Michael J. O’Connor
†
INTRODUCTION
For over thirty years, the federal government has relied on
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) as its principal weapon
for punishing computermisuse.
1
Shortly after themovieWarGames
2
popularized the idea that teenage boys were hacking into Pentagon
supercomputers, Congress first drafted the CFAA to protect a few
federal computers. From that narrow beginning, Congress has
repeatedly expanded the law,with its current incarnation protecting
at least every computer connected to the internet.
3
Despite its age, key terms in the CFAA remain undefined. In
particular, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has explained
what it means to access a computer “without authorization.”
4
This
phrase pervades the statute, dividing innocent computer use from
malicious computer abuse. And yet the circuits split deeply over
its meaning.
5
Two philosophical extremes have developed. On one side,
some scholars and civil rights groups claim that virtually any
†
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Steve Ross, and Megan Wright for their helpful suggestions. Michael Antonino and
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1
See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reasonably Construing the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act to Avoid Overcriminalization, HERITAGEFOUND. (June 19, 2013), https://www.
heritage.org/government-regulation/report/reasonably-construing-the-computer-fraud-
and-abuse-act-avoid [https://perma.cc/T66F-Z7XZ] (“The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) is the federal government’s principal legal weapon in the battle to protect
computer systems and electronically stored information from thieves and vandals.”).
2
WARGAMES (United Artists 1983).
3
See18U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (defining “protected computer” to includeevery computer
“which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication”); Paul J. Larkin,
Jr., United States v. Nosal: Rebooting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 8 SETONHALLCIR.
REV. 257, 261 (2012) (“The CFAA effectively reaches any computer connected to the Internet by
wire or wireless technology, as well as perhaps any other, unconnected computer that any
company or personworldwide uses in any commercial or financial transaction that has an effect
on commerce in the United States.”).
4
EFCultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“Congress did not define the phrase ‘without authorization,’ perhaps assuming that the
words speak for themselves. The meaning, however, has proven to be elusive.”).
5
See infra Part II.
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CFAA enforcement departs from the principles underpinning a
free and open internet. To separate criminal hacking from mere
bad behavior, they propose a bright-line rule: unless a suspected
hacker bypasses a password gate, no CFAA liability attaches.
6
On
the other extreme, some courts consider “without authorization”
to capture not only external hackers, but workers disloyal to their
employers and even website users that violate terms of service.
7
Unhappy with both extremes, courts have usually staked out a
middle ground, picking and choosing principles from each side.
8
Unfortunately, without a clear philosophical anchor, this
precedent whipsaws back and forth.
9
And it has fragmented in an
extraordinary way. Providing a definitive count for total
approaches may prove impossible. Various court opinions and
scholarly articles put the number somewhere between two and
five.
10
That condition cannot stand. The law loses the public trust
when the same actions garner an acquittal in Los Angeles and a
conviction in Chicago.
Trespass law could remedy that confusion. Trespass law
builds upon centuries of disputes, chronicling human strengths
and frailties, recognizing rights and obligations. It explains when
we can shut others out and when wemust let them in. It can do the
same now, with cyber-trespass. But scholars have traditionally
opposed importing trespass precedents to hacking statutes,
concerned with creating an “anti-commons” where system owners
like Comcast, website owners like Twitter, and content owners like
Disney can stake claims to vast internet property and enforce them
through criminal law.
11
Courts have been similarly reluctant to
import traditional trespass rules. Though less clear in their
reasons, judges referring to “a cybernaut with a BitTorrent
protocol” may have difficulty drawing the necessary analogies
between old concepts and new technologies.
12
Still, scholars recognize that the deepening circuit split is
untenable. In recent articles, leading scholars and practitioners
like Orin Kerr, Josh Goldfoot, and Aditya Bamzai acknowledge
that the trespass framework could resolve the wrangling over
CFAA authorization.
13
At the same time, others suggest that
6
See infra Section II.D.
7
See infra Sections II.A, B.
8
See infra Section II.C.
9
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Section II.D.
12
Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1262 (W.D.Wash. 2018).
13
See, e.g., Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the Crime
of Hacking, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1478 (2016) (“The text, structure, and history of
the CFAA all indicate that its ‘without authorization’ term incorporates preexisting
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resources like antitrust law can manage the “anti-commons”
risks.
14
But scholars remain divided over broadly importing
specific trespass precedents. Professor Kerr suggests that we
cannot easily analogize these precedents to modern facts.
15
He
believes that we face an unappealing choice: either 1) we must
wait long years for independent computer trespass norms to
develop; or 2) the courts must resolve the uncertainty and impose
norms now.
16
Mr. Goldfoot and Professor Bamzai argue that
trespass precedents prove more than capable, but decline to begin
drawing analogies from old precedents to resolve current disputes
in the case law.
17
This article agrees with Goldfoot and Bamzai’s contention
and starts to fill the gap left in the scholarship. Trespass
precedents provide a framework for dealing with the wide factual
differences among potential cases. Courts have hammered out
how a property owner’s rights intersect an employee’s rights and
how both affect a customer. As Warren and Brandeis once said in
their famous article on privacy, “[T]he common law provides [us]
with [a weapon], forged in the slow fire of the centuries, and to-
day fitly tempered to [our] hand.”
18
This article focuses on specific trespass precedents, using
them to hone the CFAA’s edge. When we examine trespass more
deeply, many insights emerge. These precedents reject at least
three main CFAA approaches taken by the Courts of Appeals and
scholars.
19
They suggest ways to channel the final approach.
20
They also suggest resolutions to particular applications that have
similarly split the circuits, like what to do when an outsider
induces an employee to steal secrets.
21
Part I of this article discusses the CFAA’s history. Part II
explains the current circuit split over authorization, and applies
trespass precedents to reject certain approaches and narrow the
physical trespass rules.”); Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
1143, 1146 (2016) (“[C]oncepts of authorization rest on trespass norms.”).
14
See infra Section III.B.2.
15
See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1157–58 (“[C]ourts cannot merely invoke existing
trespass norms to interpret authorization to access a computer. It’s not clear any widely
shared norms exist yet. . . . Courts must instead decide between competing claims for what
the trespass norms should be, imposing an answer as a matter of law now rather than
allowing them to develop organically.”).
16
See id.
17
SeeGoldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 13, at 1499 (“Precedents on physical trespass
provide a richer and more nuanced set of doctrines than has been previously appreciated.”).
18
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 220 (1890).
19
See infra Sections II.A, II.B, & II.D.
20
See infra Section II.C.
21
See infra Section III.A.
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split overall. Part III explains and applies precedents from trespass
law to situations that arise repeatedly in CFAA litigation.
I. HISTORY OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
The CFAA arose from popular pressure to combat
computer hacking
22
and genuine concern that existing laws did
not cover common hacking crimes.
23
At first, Congress carefully
limited its scope to computers implicating national security and
financial privacy.
24
Then, Congress expanded the statute’s scope
to reach all computers in interstate commerce.
25
At the same time,
companies expanded the internet’s scope so that interstate
commerce reached all computers. Today, the CFAA essentially
encompasses every computer and computer user in the United
States, and many beyond the United States’ territorial limits. Its
use in litigation has grown in parallel. Though the first case
referencing the CFAA does not appear until 1990,
26
5 cases
appeared in 1998, 141 cases appeared in 2008, and 223 cases
appeared in 2018.
27
Enacted in 1984, the CFAA was originally a narrow
statute designed to criminalize access to computers in which the
federal government had a substantial interest.
28
Congress
limited the 1984 statute to three specific scenarios: “computer
misuse to obtain national security secrets, computer misuse to
obtain personal financial records, and hacking into U.S.
government computers.”
29
22
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3689, 3696 (“For example, themotionpicture ‘WarGames’ [sic] showedarealistic representation
of the automatic dialing and access capabilities of the personal computer.”); Patrick S. Ryan,
War, Peace, or Stalemate: Wargames, Wardialing, Wardriving, and the Emerging Market for
Hacker Ethics, VA. J.L.&TECH., Summer 2014, at 1, 27 (“Notably, the first version of the CFAA
was passed shortly after the release ofWarGames, almost as if the law were drafted to directly
address the types of activities carried out by [MatthewBroderick’s character] Lightman.”).
23
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 6 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3689, 3691 (“There is no specific federal legislation in the area of computer crime. Any
enforcement action in response to computer-related crime must rely on statutory restrictions
that were designed for other offenses, such as mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341) or wire fraud (18
U.S.C. 1343) statutes. Even if an approach is devised that apparently covers the alleged acts
in computer-related crimes, it still must be treated as an untested basis for prosecution in the
federal trial courts.”).
24
See infra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
26
See United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 416, 423 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
27
Obtained fromWestlaw searches for “Computer Fraud and Abuse Act” conducted
on all federal and state cases for the referenced years. Results on file with the author.
28
See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92.
29
Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1564 (2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(3) (Supp. II 1985)).
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In 1986, Congress added interstate offenses committed over
an interstate computer network.
30
The change meant little at the
time; three decades ago, when the internet was a curiosity rather
than the backbone of global commerce, hacking crimes were
infrequent.
31
In 1994, the CFAA’s civil provision first appeared.
32
Employers have often used this provision to punish suspected trade
secret misappropriation.
33
Indeed, one article calls the CFAA “the
employer’s new weapon.”
34
Plaintiffs have also used this civil
provision as a backdoor method for obtaining federal jurisdiction
over claims that they must typically try in state court, like theft of
trade secrets and breach of noncompete agreements.
35
In 1996, Congress dramatically expanded the CFAA. Of
principal interest are two changes to Section 1030(a)(2), now the
broadest and most commonly used provision for punishing
hacking.
36
First, the “Federal interest” computer protected under
the statute was replaced by a new category called the “protected
computer.”
37
While the prior definition covered crimes involving
computers in two ormore states, the “protected computer” included
any machine “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce
or communication.”
38
Any computer connected to the internet is fair
game.
39
Second, Section 1030(a)(2) went from prohibiting
unauthorized access that obtains certain sensitive information to
prohibiting unauthorized access that obtains any information.
40
Obtaining information includes merely reading it.
41
30
See id. at 1565.
31
Id. at 1565 (“[W]hen use of the Internet remained in its infancy, few crimes
would be included in its reach.”).
32
See Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit.
XXIX § 290001(d), 108 Stat. 2097, 2098 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)).
33
See, e.g., WEC Carolina Energy Sols., LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 201–02
(4th Cir. 2012).
34
RichardWarner, The Employer’s NewWeapon: Employee Liability Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 11, 11 (2008).
35
See Kelsey T. Patterson, Note, Narrowing It Down to One Narrow View:
Clarifying and Limiting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 7 CHARLESTONL. REV. 489,
496 (2013) (“[A]sserting a claim under a federal statute, such as the CFAA, opens the
door to federal court.”).
36
See TimWu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, NEWYORKER (Mar. 18, 2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-in-technology [https://per
ma.cc/5CPD-YG4T] (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) as the “broadest provision”).
37
See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat.
3488, 3491–92 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
38
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2).
39
See Kerr, supra note 29, at 1568.
40
Id. at 1566–67.
41
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2484
(explaining that “obtaining information” in the statute included “mere observation of the
data”); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255,
1276 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
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Considering all these changes together, a statute that
originally barred hacking into sensitive government computers or
centralized financial databases now federally criminalizes all
hacking.
42
This includes hackingwhere the target computer resides
on the same street, on the same floor, or even in the same room as
the hacker, so long as the target was connected to the internet.
43
II. “WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION” AND “EXCEEDS AUTHORIZED
ACCESS”
The CFAA punishes whoever “intentionally accesses a
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access.”
44
In its wisdom, Congress defined neither “access” nor
“authorization.”
45
Surprisingly, however, Congress did define
“exceeds authorized access,” explaining that it “means to access
a computer with authorization” and then transgress that
authorization’s boundaries.
46
Left with half-defined key terms, both courts and
scholars have found themselves somewhat lost at sea.
47
We don’t
42
See Kerr, supra note 29, at 1561 (“The statute, originally designed to criminalize
only important federal interest computer crimes, potentially regulates every use of every
computer in theUnitedStatesandevenmanymillions of computersabroad.” (footnote omitted)).
43
Subsequent amendment expanded the “protected computer” definition yet
again, now reaching any computer even “affecting” interstate commerce. Id. at 1569–71.
Under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, this would likely reach every computer, even
those lacking any internet connection. See id. But given the internet’s modern ubiquity, this
may mean a legal distinction without practical difference.
44
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). Similar language appears throughout the statute,
but (a)(2) is the broadest and most frequently charged provision.
45
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (defining neither “access” nor “without authorization”);
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Congress
did not define the phrase ‘without authorization,’ perhaps assuming that the words speak
for themselves. The meaning, however, has proven to be elusive.”). For over thirty years,
Congress has repeatedly refined the CFAA without addressing these terms. See supra Part
I. At this point, one can only assume intentional inaction. But Congress may well have good
reason for staying out of it. As one commentator notes, Congress has decided to sacrifice
precision for flexibility, crafting a single statute that can broadly apply to the many ways
individuals abuse computers. See Greg Pollaro, Comment, Disloyal Computer Use and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Narrowing the Scope, 2010 DUKEL.&TECH. REV. 12, ¶ 10
(“Congress decided early in the CFAA’s history that it wanted a single statute to cover the
field of computer crime ‘rather than identifying and amending every potentially applicable
statute affected by advances in computer technology.’ The price for this legislative
expediency is that one relatively brief statute is applied to a range of disparate activities
such as fraud, trespass, spam, phishing, worms, viruses and denial of service attacks. This
has inevitably forced square pegs into round holes.” (citations and footnotes omitted)).
46
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (“[T]he term ‘exceeds authorized access’ means to access
a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”).
47
See Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“The
term ‘authorization’ is not further defined, leaving courts to wrestle with the breadth of its
meaning as increasingly, employers have used a statute originally designed to punish hackers
against disloyal employees.”); Kerr, supra note 29, at 1562 (“The meaning of unauthorized
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even know how many approaches exist: at least two,
48
likely
three,
49
and perhaps four or five.
50
This article organizes the
approaches into four groups—Citrin’s agency approach, the use
contract approach, the access contract approach, and the code-
based approach—but acknowledges that other divisions may be
equally sensible. The discussion below progresses from the
approach generating the most liability to the least, and thus
starts with Citrin’s agency approach, likely capturing the most
behavior within the CFAA’s civil and criminal ambit.
A. Citrin’s Agency Approach
In International Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, the Seventh
Circuit attempted to create a comprehensive framework for
authorization under the CFAA.
51
The court articulated an agency-
based approach that premised authorization on employee loyalty.
Defendant Jacob Citrin decided to go into business for
himself, competing with his current employer International
Airport Centers (IAC).
52
Because this violated Citrin’s employment
agreement, he wanted to hobble his employer’s ability to gather
evidence showing his bad acts. For that reason, he wiped his work
laptop before leaving.
53
IAC subsequently sued Citrin under the
CFAA for this “damage.”
54
IAC had issued this laptop to Citrin and authorized him to
use it. While IAC permitted Citrin to use it for the company’s
benefit, the Seventh Circuit concluded that IAC’s authorization
lapsed the moment Citrin decided to use (or abuse) it for his own
access is remarkably unclear, however, with courts and commentators disagreeing sharply as
to how much conduct counts and what principle of authorization the statute adopts.”).
48
See, e.g., United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 524–25 (2d Cir. 2015) (dividing the
approaches in two); Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1445 (2016) (“Many courts
summarizing the caselaw refer only to two different approaches—‘broad’ and ‘narrow.’”).
49
See Patterson, supra note 35, at 499 (summarizing scholarly articles as
recognizing “the agency-based theory, the code-based theory, and the contract-based theory”).
50
See Bellia, supra note 48, at 1445 (“[T]he caselaw reflects at least five different
interpretive paradigms.”); Patterson, supra note 35, at 499–500 (splitting the approaches
into agency, broad contract-based, narrow contract-based, and code-based).
51
Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419–20 (7th Cir. 2006).
52
Id. at 419.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 420 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii)).
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benefit.
55
But the CFAA never mentions a duty of loyalty.
56
To
read this obligation into the CFAA, the Seventh Circuit looked to
agency law, holding that Citrin automatically lost authorization
when he transgressed the duty of loyalty that employees owe to
their employers.
57
Citrin bears analytical shortcomings raised repeatedly by
courts
58
and commentators.
59
Perhaps most notably, it lacks
deference to the statutory text. Reading “without authorization”
in this way eliminates situations in which a user “exceeds
authorized access.”
60
If a party “use[s their] access to obtain or
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled
so to obtain or alter,” Congress says they “exceed[ ] authorized
access.”
61
But courts adopting Citrin’s approach would say that
the user’s disloyalty stripped their original authorization, and
thus they are “without authorization.”
62
Under this approach, no
situations exist where a party would exceed authorized access.
55
Id. (“[Citrin’s] authorization to access the laptop terminated when, having
already engaged in misconduct and decided to quit IAC in violation of his employment
contract, he resolved to destroy files that incriminated himself and other files that were
also the property of his employer, in violation of the duty of loyalty that agency law imposes
on an employee.” (first citing United States v. Galindo, 871 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1989);
then citing Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d
1121, 1124–25 (W.D. Wash. 2000); and then citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 112, 387 (AM. LAW INST. 1958))).
56
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
57
See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419–20.
58
See, e.g., WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th
Cir. 2012) (“[T]he [agency] theory has far-reaching effects unintended by Congress.”);
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133–35 (9th Cir. 2009).
59
See, e.g., Larkin, Jr., supra note 3, at 273–74 (finding no evidence that
Congress intended to incorporate state law agency principles, based on lack of any settled
meaning in common or state statutory law); Samantha Jensen, Comment, Abusing the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why Broad Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE
L. REV. 81, 120 (2013) (“To the agency interpretation’s logical conclusion, every employee
giving notice spends her last two weeks incurring potential civil and criminal liability each
time she accesses a computer.”).
60
TheSeventhCircuit did address this point but called the difference between access
“without authorization” and “exceeding authorized access” “paper thin.”Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420.
Citing EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583–84 (1st Cir. 2001), the
Seventh Circuit explained that a former employee that accessed a public website and elevated
their access by using confidential information would “exceed[ ] authorized access.” Citrin, 440
F.3d at 420. This distinction makes little sense, as a former employee would still violate their
residual duty of loyalty by using confidential information for their own benefit.
61
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
62
SeeDiamond Power Int’l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1342–43 (N.D.
Ga. 2007) (“Under [Citrin and Shurgard], an employee who accesses a computer with initial
authorization but later acquires (with an improper purpose) files to which he is not entitled—
and in so doing, breaches his duty of loyalty—is ‘without authorization,’ despite the Act’s
contemplation that such a situation constitutes accessing ‘with authorization’ but by
‘exceed[ing] authorized access.’ 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6). The construction of Citrin and
Shurgard thus conflates the meaning of those two distinct phrases . . . .” (second alteration in
original)); see alsoMatthew Gordon, Note, A Hybrid Approach to Analyzing Authorization in
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 21 B.U. J. SCI. &TECH. L. 357, 364 (2015).
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Citrin also conflicts with trespass precedent, which
ignores loyalty or disloyalty to a landowner when determining
whether a trespass has occurred. In Desnick v. American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc., ophthalmologist Dr. J. H.
Desnick sued for trespass after a news investigation where
PrimeTime Live reporters used hidden cameras to pose as
patients despite telling Desnick the piece “would not involve
‘ambush’ interviews or ‘undercover’ surveillance.”
63
But even
though consent obtained by fraud is not consent,
64
the Seventh
Circuit held that no trespass occurred.
65
The law operates on up-
front permissions and prohibitions. If the clinic permitted
prospective patients, it must likewise welcome the reporters
posing as prospective patients.
66
As the Seventh Circuit
explained, the law will not speculate about property owner
preferences and peer into the visitor’s mind to determine
criminality.
67
To hold otherwise would expose the unhappy
restaurant critic, the frugal window shopper, and the
unpleasant dinner guest to trespass charges.
68
Desnick seems
consistent with broader precedent. Courts have applied similar
principles to acquit unwanted protesters in common areas of
private property.
69
Leading casebooks and treatises never link
trespass with loyalty.
70
63
Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1347–48 (7th Cir. 1995).
64
See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 79, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019)
(“Neither express nor implied consent constitutes a viable defense to a trespass action, if it
was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 173 (AM.
LAW. INST. 1934) (“Assent of the possessor of land fraudulently obtained or acted upon by
the actor is not a consent to his entry thereon.”).
65
Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1351–53.
66
See id. at 1352 (“There was no invasion in the present case of any of the specific
interests that the tort of trespass seeks to protect. The test patients entered offices that
were open to anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic services . . . .”).
67
Id. at 1351 (“[C]onsent to an entry is often given legal effect even though the
entrant has intentions that if known to the owner of the property would cause him for perfectly
understandable and generally ethical or at least lawful reasons to revoke his consent.”).
68
See id. at 1351.
69
See St. Louis County. v. Stone, 776 S.W.2d 885, 887–88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(rejecting trespass charge where common area remained generally open to public, even
though owner posted “no trespassing” signs “to lead ‘certain individuals’ to know that
they did not have his consent”).
70
Leading authorities include no relevant mentions of loyalty in the trespass
sections. See, e.g., GLEASON L. ARCHER, THE LAW OF TORTS 174–86 (1920), https://books.
google.com/books?id=Pg4aAAAAYAAJ; 9 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE
LAW 438–550 (1846), https://books.google.com/books?id=m2kyAAAAIAAJ; MELVILLEM.
BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 206–30 (6th ed. 1896), https://books.google.
com/books?id=B309AAAAIAAJ; FRANCIS TAYLOR PIGGOTT, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 329–41 (1885), https://books.google.com/books?id=mZ0DAAAAQAAJ; WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 76–94 (1st ed. 1941); JOHN W. SALMOND,
THE LAW OF TORTS 155–73 (1907), https://books.google.com/books?id=5AA0AAAAIAAJ;
1 THOMASW.WATERMAN, A TREATISE ON THELAWOFTRESPASS IN THETWOFOLDASPECT
OF THEWRONG AND THE REMEDY (1875), https://books.google.com/books?id=3XM9AAAA
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One notable counterpoint is Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., in which reporters posed as grocery store
employees to videotape unsafe food handling practices.
71
The
Fourth Circuit held that by breaching their duty of loyalty, the
reporters opened themselves to trespass damages.
72
But even
taken at face value, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion channels this
holding into a less radical form, explaining that the reporters
“exce[eded their] authority to enter Food Lion’s premises as
employees.”
73
The common law has always allowed a property
owner to set the boundaries of consent up-front.
74
These boundaries
may take the form of explicit, up-front prohibitions.
75
Alternatively,
a visitor-turned-trespasser may transgress broadly accepted
societal understandings about how far the entry privilege
extends.
76
An employee entering under false pretenses with the
intent to plant a hidden video camera could extend beyond societal
understanding about an employee’s privileges.
77
The difficulty with
Food Lion is twofold: first, the Fourth Circuit makes sloppy and
unhelpful references to the duty of loyalty when it really relies on
a particular view regarding up-front permissions; second, society
has difficulty identifying actions that step so far beyond the pale as
to transgress entry permission even when the property owner never
explicitly prohibits that action themselves. But even if we must
consider the duty of loyalty, neither Citrin nor Food Lion suggests
that rule extends beyond employee trespasses.
The internet certainly does not invite applying a duty of
loyalty to trespass law; if anything, it reinforces the questionable
wisdom that would entail. Assuming that an employee bears a duty
to his employer, I bear no such duty to every random web service
provider. My duty to Amazon extends only so far as they continue to
provideme the goods and services Iwant at competitive prices. Ours
is a mercenary relationship. The same holds true for Facebook
posters, LinkedIn searchers, and Twitter followers. If taken beyond
IAAJ; 2 THOMASW.WATERMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRESPASS IN THE TWOFOLD
ASPECT OF THEWRONG AND THEREMEDY (1875), https://books.google.com/books?id=SnM
9AAAAIAAJ.
71
SeeFoodLion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510–11 (4thCir. 1999).
72
See id. at 518 (“The jury also found that the reporters committed trespass by
breaching their duty of loyalty to Food Lion ‘as a result of pursuing [their] investigation for
ABC.’ We affirm the finding of trespass on this ground because the breach of duty of
loyalty—triggered by the filming in non-public areas, which was adverse to Food Lion—
was a wrongful act in excess of Dale’s and Barnett’s authority to enter Food Lion’s premises
as employees.” (alteration in original)).
73
Id.
74
See infra notes 218–219 and accompanying text.
75
See infra notes 218–219 and accompanying text.
76
See infra notes 218–219 and accompanying text.
77
See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 518–19.
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the employer context, then Citrin’s reach seems boundless and its
results dangerous. Perhaps for that reason, several courts have
limited these duties to those spelled out in written, formal
agreements, a view generally called the contract approach.
B. The Use Contract Approach
Seemingly uncomfortable with cabining criminal liability
only by the loose concept of agency, no other circuits have adopted
Citrin’s unalloyed reliance on that doctrine. Instead, some have
sought to confine “without authorization” within more definite
bounds. Just as the Desnick Court based trespass on up-front
permissions and prohibitions,
78
these circuits base CFAA liability
on violating contracts and terms of service.
79
But the contracts
don’t merely specify the times, circumstances, and methods by
which a user can access the system, they often specify what a user
can do after they access it. This turns an anti-hacking statute into
a general license to combat bad behavior.
The contract approach predates Citrin. In EF Cultural
Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., the First Circuit concluded that
violating a confidentiality agreement, transmitting proprietary
data, and using that data to access a public website would likely
“exceed[ ] authorized access.”
80
No evidence suggested that the
proprietary data offered access to secure or exclusive website
areas. Indeed, all the pages accessed were publicly available.
81
Even so, the First Circuit concluded that using the data while
navigating the “website reeks of use—and, indeed, abuse—of
proprietary information that goes beyond any authorized use of
EF’s website.”
82
While questioning Explorica’s breadth, in United States v.
John the Fifth Circuit later agreed with its fundamental
conclusion: criminal liability under the CFAA encompasses not
78
See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352 (“There was no invasion in the present case of any
of the specific interests that the tort of trespass seeks to protect. The test patients entered
offices that were open to anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic services . . . .”).
79
Admittedly, Citrin itself notes that the defendant “decided to quit IAC and
go into business for himself, in breach of his employment contract.” Int’l Airport Ctrs.,
LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006). But the Seventh Circuit never suggests
that Citrin’s contract or breach thereof limited his access or use of IAC’s systems.
80
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582–84 (1st Cir.
2001).
81
The First Circuit conceded this point in a later companion opinion. See EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 61–63 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[I]t appears that
the codes could be extracted more slowly by examining EF’s webpages manually, so it is
far from clear that Zefer would have had to know that they were confidential. The only
information that Zefer received that was described as confidential (passwords for tour-
leader access) apparently had no role in the scraper project.” (footnote omitted)).
82
Explorica, 274 F.3d at 583.
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merely circumventing access restrictions, but ignoring use
restrictions as well.
83
In John, defendant Dimetriace Eva-Lavon
John was a Citigroup account manager with unrestricted access to
customer account information.
84
She was convicted under the
CFAA for passing confidential customer account information to her
confederates, which the group used to commit fraud.
85
John argued
that her CFAA conviction could not stand because Citigroup’s
policies restricted only how she used the information.
86
The Fifth
Circuit held that Citigroup’s policies were immaterial, concluding
that violating use restrictions sufficed.
87
Though commonly cited to enforce employment agreements,
the use contract approach cannot be so easily confined. Logically, it
also encompasses violatingwebsite terms of service. Indeed, theU.S.
Government advocated precisely this position in United States v.
Drew.
88
That case arose when middle-aged mother Lori Drew
created a fake MySpace account to humiliate Megan Meier, a
teenage girl purportedly spreading rumors about Drew’s own
daughter.
89
After Drew’s online persona—non-existent teenage boy
Josh Evans—befriended then insulted and callously disregarded
Meier, the girl committed suicide.
90
Seeking justice using any tool
available, theGovernment chargedDrewwith violating theCFAA.
91
The Government’s claim: Drew was “without authorization” or “in
excess of authorization” by violating theMySpaceTerms of Service.
92
These terms required accurate user profile information and
prohibited abusive behavior.
93
Arrested, charged, and convicted by
the jury, Lori Drew was saved from jail by the district judge.
94
The
Court concluded that MySpace’s Terms of Service were too vague to
83
See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 2010).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 269–70
86
Id. at 271.
87
Id. (“The question before us is whether ‘authorized access’ or ‘authorization’ may
encompass limits placed on the use of information obtained by permitted access to a computer
system . . . . We conclude that it may, at least when the user . . . reasonably should know that
he or she is not authorized to access a computer . . . to perpetrate a crime.”). One hopes that
everyone realizes they are doing something criminal when perpetrating a crime.
88
See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 454 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
89
See Kim Zetter, Judge Acquits Lori Drew in Cyberbullying Case, Overrules
Jury, WIRED (July 2, 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/07/drew-court/ [https://perma.cc/
7RDT-NU5R].
90
See id.
91
See id.
92
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 461.
93
Id. at 454.
94
See id. at 462–68.
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put Drew on notice that violating them would strip her of
authorization to use the site.
95
Despite Drew’s release, the underlying logic holds. If
Explorica and John win out, then terms of service logically bind
users just as much as employment agreements. This approach
would turn most internet users into criminals. Courts and
scholars take it as a given that internet users ignore terms of
service.
96
Empirical studies support this conclusion.
97
Criminally
punishing terms-of-service violations conflicts with our sense of
justice. Criminal law should punish exceptional behavior
generally opposed by society. The Supreme Court has wisely
cautioned against interpreting statutes “to criminalize a broad
range of apparently innocent conduct.”
98
Citrin and the use contract approach also ignore a key
point: The CFAA repeatedly ties authorization to access.
99
The
question is not whether some aspect of the user’s interaction
with the system was unwanted by the owner, but whether their
access was unwanted. Indeed, an earlier version of the statute
considered use,
100
but Congress abandoned that approach. This
95
See, e.g., id. at 465 (“TheMSTOS does not specify which precise terms of service,
when breached,will result in a termination ofMySpace’s authorization for the visitor/member
to access the website.”).
96
SeeUnited States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2012); Kerr, supra
note 29, at 1581.
97
See, e.g., Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the
Internet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking
Services, 23 INFOCOMM&SOC’Y 128 (2018) (finding that more than seventy percent of users
never opened the agreement and those who did spent fewer than two minutes reviewing
policies that should take at least fifteen minutes to read); see also Jens Grossklags & Nathan
Good, Empirical Studies on Software Notices to Inform Policy Makers and Usability
Designers, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SECURITY 341–55 (2007) (showing lack of
notice and consent for software installation agreements).
98
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985).
99
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (“intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access”); Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d
610, 619 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“These [use contract] rulings wrap the intent of the employees
and use of the information into the CFAA despite the fact that the statute narrowly governs
access, not use. . . . Subjective intent departs from the original view that the CFAA
concerns what is ‘tantamount to trespass in a computer.’” (quoting Clinton Plumbing &
Heating v. Ciaccio, No. 09-2751, 2010 WL 4224473, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2010))); H.R.
REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3706 (“[S]ection
1030 deals with an ‘unauthorized access’ concept of computer fraud rather than the mere
use of a computer. Thus, the conduct prohibited is analogous to that of ‘breaking and
entering’ rather than using a computer (similar to the use of a gun) in committing the
offense.”); David J. Schmitt, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Should Not Apply to the
Misuse of Information Accessed with Permission, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 432 (2014)
(“The CFAA was aimed at ‘outside hackers’ who improperly access protected computers,
and ‘inside hackers’ who have permission to use protected computers but obtain
information beyond the permission that had been granted.” (citation omitted)).
100
CounterfeitAccessDevice andComputerFraudandAbuseAct of 1984,Pub.L.No.
98-473 § 2102, 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–91 (“Whoever . . . knowingly accesses a computer without
authorization, or having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such
access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend . . . .”).
434 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:2
provides strong evidence that the CFAA does not criminalize
improper use.
101
Common law trespass has always maintained this
distinction between unwelcome access (a trespass) and
unwelcome behavior (not a trespass). As Blackstone explained
and modern sources confirm, a patron has a general license to
enter a public tavern. But if he abuses his access and “tarries
there all night contrary to the inclinations of the owner[,] this
wrongful act shall affect and have relation back, even to his first
entry, and make the whole a trespass.”
102
The same theory
captures many property abuses, as jurist and scholar Thomas
Street once explained:
If a lessor who enters to view for waste, damages the house, or
even stays all night; if a purveyor, who takes cattle for the royal
household, converts them to his own use by selling; if a commoner,
who lawfully enters the common, cuts down trees; if a man who enters
an inn continues all night against the will of the taverner; if the lord
of a fair or market works a horse distrained for toil; or if an officer who
has attached goods keeps possession of the house wherein they are
taken, for an unreasonable time, without removing the goods to a
place of safety; in all these cases the wrongdoer is a trespasser ab
initio.
103
In other words, if one exercises a privilege to enter or
control a property and then abuses that privilege, “the law
presumes that the wrongdoer entered with the intent to commit
the trespass.”
104
As Chief Justice Coke explained, external
actions reveal secret intent: “[T]he law adjudges by the
subsequent act, quo animo, or to what intent, he entered; for
acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta.”
105
When a villain uses
101
See ANTONINSCALIA&BRYANA.GARNER, READINGLAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS § 40 (2012) (“Reenactment Canon. If the legislature amends or reenacts a
provision other than byway of a consolidating statute or restyling project, a significant change
in language is presumed to entail a change in meaning.”); Jensen, supra note 59, at 125
(“Agency and contract-based interpretations are incorrect because persistent incorporation of
‘use’ flagrantly returns the CFAA to a version Congress has expressly revoked.”).
102
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *213.
103
1 THOMAS A. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY: A
PRESENTATION OF THE THEORY ANDDEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 46 (1906), https:
//books.google.com/books?id=A0UzAQAAMAAJ (footnotes omitted).
104
ARCHER, supranote 70, at 183; see also 2WILLIAMBLACKSTONE,COMMENTARIES
*213 (“[I]f a reversioner, who enters on [pretense] of seeing waste, breaks the house, or stays
there all night; or if the commonerwho comes to tend his cattle, cuts down a tree; in these and
similar cases, the law judges that he entered for this unlawful purpose, and therefore, as the
act which demonstrates such his purpose is a trespass, he shall be esteemed a trespasser ab
initio.” (first emphasis added)); 9 BACON, supra note 70, at 450–51 (“[T]he law intends, from
the subsequent tortious act, that there was from the beginning a design to be guilty of an
abuse of the authority.”).
105
The Six Carpenters’ Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 695, 696.
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the law as cover to do the illegal act they planned from the
beginning, he gets punished even back to the beginning.
But when the tavern drunkard refuses to pay for his wine,
that makes him a deadbeat, not a trespasser.
106
Only a later
trespass triggers this relation back to the initial trespass.
107
Mere
bad behavior never triggers it. This ancient division between
trespassory and non-trespassory behavior demonstrates why the
use contract approach—punishing behavior unrelated to access—
cannot justify punishment under the CFAA.
With its non-trespassory carveout under trespass ab initio,
the common law refused to convert a legal entry into trespass due
to later non-trespassory conduct. Both Citrin and the use contract
approach run counter to this precedent. Each treats the non-
trespassory behavior as transforming the original privileged access
into a trespass. This modern mistake emphasizes the need to
reexamine these ancient distinctions. Whether physical or
electronic, merely wrongful acts are not trespasses.
Several circuits have voiced their discomfort with the use
contract approach. In its en banc decision inU.S. v. Nosal (Nosal
I), the Ninth Circuit rejected importing agency or use contract
principles into the CFAA.
108
In Nosal I, the defendant used his
former colleagues at executive search firm Korn/Ferry to steal
trade secret files.
109
These colleagues had authorized access to
Korn/Ferry’s network and to the specific database that stored
the trade secret information.
110
Charged on CFAA violations,
106
See 2 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *213 (“[A] bare non-feasance, as
not paying for the wine he calls for, will not make him a trespasser; for this is only a breach
of contract, for which the taverner shall have an action of debt or assumpsit against him.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTORTS § 214 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“It was also held that
the subsequent act must be one which in itself would amount to a trespass, and that a mere
omission, such as a failure to pay for drinks after entry, was not sufficient.”).
107
See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *213 (“[I]f a reversioner,
who enters on [pretense] of seeing waste, breaks the house, or stays there all night; or if
the commoner who comes to tend his cattle, cuts down a tree; in these and similar cases,
the law judges that he entered for this unlawful purpose, and therefore, as the act which
demonstrates such his purpose is a trespass, he shall be deemed a trespasser ab initio.”
(first emphasis added)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 214 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
1965); 2 MODERN AMERICAN LAW 70 (1914), https://books.google.com/books?id=0RMaAA
AAYAAJ (“The original act must have been a trespass but for the justification, and the
subsequent act must be an act of trespass . . . .”); BIGELOW, supra note 70, at 226 (“[O]ne
who has taken possession of goods, or entered upon land, by virtue of a license of the law,
becomes a trespass ab initio (notwithstanding the lawfulness of the levy or entry), where
afterwards, while acting under the license, he commits an act which in itself amounts to
a trespass.”); 2 WATERMAN, supra note 70, at 195–97 (“[I]t seems to be the better opinion
that a man cannot become a trespass ab initio by any act or omission which would not
itself, if not protected by a license, be the subject of trespass.”).
108
SeeUnitedStates v.Nosal (Nosal I), 676F.3d854, 860–61 (9thCir. 2012) (enbanc).
109
Id. at 856.
110
Id.; see also United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 844 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir.
2016) (“Searcher was hosted on the company’s internal computer network . . . . Korn/Ferry
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trade secret theft, mail fraud, and other counts, the defendant
moved to dismiss the CFAA counts.
111
Nosal I concluded that “without authorization” could only
mean a party not authorized to access the system at all.
112
Outside
hackers would fit this definition.
113
By extension, “exceeds
authorized access” could only mean a party authorized to use the
system but not authorized for the file or function accessed.
114
The
mailroom worker who dug into the CEO’s files would fit this
definition. Regardless, actions taken after the access—passing
trade secret files to third parties, for example—bore no relevance
to this determination.
115
Other courts have adopted and expanded
Nosal I’s reasoning.
116
One commentator summed up the Nosal I holding with
an apt analogy to the difference between theft and burglary:
If a person is invited into someone’s home and steals jewelry while
inside, the person has committed a crime—but not burglary—because
he has not broken into the home. The fact that the person committed
a crime while inside the home does not change the fact that he was
given permission to enter.
117
In trying to punish bad behavior, some courts have lost the
dividing line between hacking and trade secret theft.
If the agency or contract interpretations for the CFAA
win out, Nosal I suggests an endlessly malleable criminal law
will result.
118
Any employee that violates an employer’s trust or
issued each employee a unique username and password to its computer system; no separate
password was required to access Searcher.”).
111
Nosal I, 676 F.3d. at 856.
112
Id. at 858 (“[I]t is possible to read both prohibitions as applying to hackers:
‘[W]ithout authorization’ would apply to outside hackers (individuals who have no
authorized access to the computer at all) and ‘exceeds authorized access’ would apply to
inside hackers (individuals whose initial access to a computer is authorized but who access
unauthorized information or files).”).
113
See id.
114
See id.
115
See id. at 863–64 (“This narrower interpretation is also a more sensible
reading of the text and legislative history of a statute whose general purpose is to punish
hacking—the circumvention of technological access barriers—not misappropriation of
trade secrets—a subject Congress has dealt with elsewhere. Therefore, we hold that
‘exceeds authorized access’ in the CFAA is limited to violations of restrictions on access
to information, and not restrictions on its use.” (citation omitted)).
116
See, e.g., United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 524–27 (2d Cir. 2015); WEC
Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204–05 (4th Cir. 2012); Diamond
Power Int’l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1342–43 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
117
ThomasE. Booms,Hacking into Federal Court: Employee “Authorization”Under
the Computer Fraud andAbuse Act, 13 VAND. J.ENT.&TECH. L. 543, 571 (2011) (quotedwith
approval inDresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614 (E.D. Pa. 2013)).
118
See Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 862 (“Not only are the terms of service vague and
generally unknown—unless you look real hard at the small print at the bottom of a
webpage—but website owners retain the right to change the terms at any time and without
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its computer-use policy could end up behind bars. Calling a
family member from their work phone, checking scores on
ESPN.com, or playing Sudoku online would all result in
potential trips to jail.
119
The effect sweeps more broadly when considering website
terms of service. These turgid documents, accessible only from a
tiny link buried in a website’s footer, are nonetheless legally
binding contracts.
120
Under the agency and contract theories, the
CFAA would hold visitors criminally responsible for violating
these terms. Were these documents written by reasonable
humans, this might not be so bad. But the internet abounds with
awful terms of service. Nosal I points to Google’s longstanding
clause (from 2007 to 2012) barring minors from all Google
services.
121
Teenagers by the millions were committing federal
crimes and didn’t even know it. Facebook requires users to
publish their real name, provide accurate information about
themselves, avoid creating more than one account, and refrain
from sharing passwords with others.
122
Whenever a Facebook user
tries to duck their ex with a fake name or present a more polished
personality by using a second account for work, they expose
themselves to prosecution. EHarmony’s restrictions on user-
posted content stretch more than a full page, including a ban on
anything “objectionable.”
123
Every single human has been found
“objectionable” by another at some point. When dating in the real
world, that means cutting the date short with a friend’s fake
phone call. With EHarmony, it could mean prison.
Criminalizing common-if-frowned-upon behavior should
raise concerns. Indeed, the Supreme Court has warned against
interpreting statutes to give that effect.
124
Criminalizing contract
notice. . . . Accordingly, behavior that wasn’t criminal yesterday can become criminal today
without an act of Congress, and without any notice whatsoever.”).
119
Id. at 860 (“Employees who call family members from their work phones will
become criminals if they send an email instead. Employees can sneak in the sports section
of the New York Times to read at work, but they’d better not visit ESPN.com. And sudoku
enthusiasts should stick to the printed puzzles, because visiting www.dailysudoku.com
from their work computers might give them more than enough time to hone their sudoku
skills behind bars.”).
120
Sometimes. In contract disputes, clickwrap agreements have generally been
upheld, while linked agreements (sometimes called “browsewrap agreements”) have seen
mixed results. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Common Law and Statutory Restrictions on
Access: Contract, Trespass, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 2002 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 295, 298 nn.12–13 (collecting cases).
121
See Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 861.
122
Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [https://
perma.cc/AA2G-YFZK].
123
Terms & Conditions, EHARMONY, at 3, http://static.eharmony.com/files/us/
images/terms-conditions/terms-and-conditions-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VP6-ZCBF].
124
See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949 (1988) (refusing to adopt
government’s position where it would “criminalize a broad range of day-to-day activity”).
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law is worse. Not only does it bar bad behavior; it also prevents
societally desirable behavior. As mentioned above, websites often
require providing truthful user information. But many legitimate
professions require deception. For example, the DEA has used
fake social media profiles to pursue suspects,
125
while academics
have used fake profiles to root out racial discrimination.
126
Despite these concerns, the contract approach has found
new life in decisions following Nosal I. While some courts have
acceptedNosal I’s conclusion that the statute’s plain text does not
criminalize improper use, improper access falls within the CFAA’s
reach. Moreover, courts have generally held that system and
website owners may communicate access restrictions by contract.
C. The Access Contract Approach
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in U.S. v. Rodriguez
arguably originated the access contract theory.
127
But this
approach has found expanded acceptance following the Ninth
Circuit’s en banc opinion inU.S. v. Nosal.
128
Multiple courts have
now concluded that while they may ignore use restrictions when
interpreting the CFAA, they will enforce access restrictions.
In U.S. v. Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit held that
Teleservice representative Rodriguez had violated the CFAAwhen
accessing Social Security records for personal reasons.
129
Rodriguez
received repeated, explicit warnings to access Social Security
records only when necessary for his job.
130
He ignored those
warnings.
131
Again and again, he delved into files for romantic
partners, friends, acquaintances, and virtual strangers.
132
But the
Eleventh Circuit did not rely on the use contract approach; indeed,
it stated explicitly that this case was factually distinct fromU.S. v.
John.
133
Because Rodriguez had accessed files beyond his purview,
it deemed his use irrelevant.
134
125
Facebook Demands DEA Stop Using Fake Profile Pages to Conduct
Investigations, FOX NEWS (Dec. 20, 2015), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/facebook-
demands-dea-stop-using-fake-profile-pages-to-conduct-investigations
[https://perma.cc/PBS9-BH6G].
126
See Brian Z. Mund, Comment, Protecting Deceptive Academic Research
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 385–86 (2018).
127
See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260–63 (11th Cir. 2010).
128
See Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
129
See Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263.
130
Id. at 1260.
131
Id. at 1260–62.
132
See id.
133
See id. at 1263.
134
Id. at 1263 (“[Rodriguez’s] use of information is irrelevant if he obtained the
information without authorization or as a result of exceeding authorized access.”).
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Courts and scholars have groupedRodriguezwith John and
even sometimes Citrin.
135
But these affiliations seem questionable.
Rodriguez accessed files that his employer specifically barred him
from viewing. To use an analogy, imagine Rodriguez as a bank
teller that received a master key with instructions to access a
specific safe deposit box. But while in the vault, he opened a dozen
others. This does not seem like the unconstrained approach in
Citrin and John. Rodriguez looks a lot like a situation described in
Nosal I as exceeding authorized access, where a user logs into the
systemwith permission, but then opens files that the system owner
clearly prohibits that user from seeing.
136
On the surface, the access contract approach seems more
defensible than the use contract approach. But, as Professor
Patricia Bellia suggests, the result often turns principally on
labeling, not substance, rendering the line between the two
approaches “illusory.”
137
Revisiting the EHarmony Terms of
Service that barred “objectionable” posts,
138
if EHarmony had said
“Your right to access the service immediately and automatically
terminates when you make an objectionable post,” then a court
might consider the provision an access restriction. Indeed, the
Drew Court considered the MySpace Terms of Service as a
constraint on access and would have permitted them on that
basis, even though ultimately finding that recognition of such
under the statute would create unacceptable vagueness.
139
When
135
See, e.g., Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 862 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (classifying
Rodriguez with Citrin and John); Bellia, supra note 48, at 1452 n.51 (classifyingRodriguez
with John, but not Citrin).
136
See Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 856–57 (“[A]ssume an employee is permitted to access
only product information on the company’s computer but accesses customer data: He would
‘exceed[ ] authorized access’ if he looks at the customer lists.” (second alteration in
original)).
137
Bellia, supra note 48, at 1454–55 (“Some courts have enforced restrictions on
access that attempt to incorporate restrictions on use. For example, an employer may state
that its employees have access to a confidential database for a specific purpose and that
access to the database for any other purpose is not permitted. . . . Under such an approach,
liability under the CFAA turns on whether an employer that seeks to restrict its employees’
use of confidential information happens to incorporate the use restriction into its policy on
access. The line between ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ views becomes illusory.” (footnotes omitted));
see also Jonathan Mayer, The “Narrow” Interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act: A User Guide for Applying United States v. Nosal, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1644, 1659
(2016) (“That is not to say that the access-use dichotomy is a paragon of doctrinal clarity.”).
138
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
139
SeeUnited States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462, 467 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“Clearly,
the [MySpace Terms of Service] was capable of defining the scope of authorized access of
visitors, members and/or users to the website.”). Note, though, that other courts believe
that the access contract approach narrows the CFAA and incorporated terms of service
sufficiently to avoid vagueness problems. See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32
(D.D.C. 2018) (“Read to apply only to access, and not to use, restrictions, the Access
Provision severely curtails both websites’ ability to define the law and prosecutors’ freedom
arbitrarily to enforce it. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment vagueness claim will be dismissed.”).
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owners can so easily redefine use restrictions into access
restrictions, adopting the access contract approach may not
meaningfully narrow the statute.
140
Both the use and access contract approaches also raise
policy concerns. For example, they eschew the traditional
separation between civil and criminal law. Even where contracts
for enormous sums are negotiated between sophisticated parties,
with high stakes and intentional choices, we don’t throw a
breacher in jail.
141
Trespass precedents also raise substantial questions
about this approach. As discussed in the use contract section,
finding retroactive access breaches based on a vaguely
communicated policy looks a lot like trespass ab initio.
142
This
common law policy held responsible a party who entered under
and then abused a privilege. Parties exercising a privilege might
include landlords checking on a leak in a tenant’s apartment,
police officers investigating a disturbance, or patrons visiting a
common purveyor like a tavern.
143
If these tolerated guests
abused their privilege by staying all night, then trespass ab
initio treated them as trespassers from the beginning.
144
Even when trespass ab initio remained viable law, the
doctrine held that non-trespassory privilege abuses would not
relate back.
145
Staying all night in a tavern was trespass ab
initio, but failing to pay for the wine was not.
146
This distinction
between trespassory and non-trespassory abuses constrained
trespass ab initio. Taking this intentional distinction and
drawing modern lessons from it, we concluded in the previous
140
See Patterson, supra note 35, at 527–28 (“[I]n allowing employers to control
the scope of the CFAA by merely changing the word use to access, courts adopting a
narrow contract-based approach have missed the point of narrowing the CFAA’s scope.”).
141
See Larkin, Jr., supra note 3, at 275 (“[C]riminal law generally does not
remedy contract violations. The law provides remedies for a contract breach because it
wants to encourage parties to keep their word in order for commerce to be effective.
But . . . society does not deem the parties who breach a contract to be sufficiently
blameworthy to justify the moral condemnation that accompanies a criminal conviction.
Like other contracts, therefore, terms-of-service agreements should be enforced only
through the civil law.” (footnotes omitted)).
142
See supra Section II.B.
143
SeeARCHER, supra note 70, at183 (constable and inn examples); 9 BACON, supra
note 70, at 451 (landlord). Business owners are sometimes treated as granting implied
consent rather than patrons having a privilege under law. See ARCHER, supra note 70, at 181
(“An implied license arises whenever the occupant of premises carries on a business as a
tradesman or mechanic.”). Common purveyors like taverns seem the exception to this rule.
See id. at 182 (“[L]icense of law arises whenever a public good will result from the invasion.
Typical instances are seen in the right . . . of a traveler to enter an inn or conveyance of a
common carrier . . . .”).
144
See supra Section II.B.
145
See supra Section II.B.
146
See supra Section II.B.
2020] COMMON LAW OF CYBER-TRESPASS 441
sections that courts should not apply the use contract approach
to treat modern non-trespassory abuses as access violations.
147
But the law has actually abolished trespass ab initio
entirely, which suggests thatwe should disfavor criminalizing even
supposed access violations. When created, trespass ab initio was a
necessary legal fiction.
148
In particular, it overcame medieval
pleading rules that required an unlawful initial entry, or the
wrongful later act would go unpunished.
149
But the law moved on.
Punishments developed for those later wrongs, and the doctrine’s
importance declined. Over the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, it saw both increased criticism
150
and fewer practical
applications.
151
Eventually, the Second Restatement of Torts
repudiated the doctrine entirely.
152
Yet the courts appear to have created a similar modern
doctrine in the access contract approach. This is a mistake.
Trespass ab initio was necessary to fill a gap in medieval law. No
such gap exists in modern law. A system or website owner can sue
for virtually any wrong committed by an unwelcome visitor.
Actionable causes include contract breach, trade secret theft, and
many others. There is no need to create a fiction treating later bad
acts—whatever those acts are—as unauthorized access.
At the same time, the law certainly entitles property
owners to both allow and forbid access.
153
Owners may turn away
individuals, like a specific Met, or a group, like the hated Mets
147
See supra Section II.B.
148
See Francis H. Bohlen & Harry Shulman, Effect of Subsequent Misconduct
Upon a Lawful Arrest, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 841, 847 (1928) (listing the bases for adopting
trespass ab initio).
149
See, e.g., SALMOND, supra note 70, at 168 (“The rule is primarily one of procedure,
the effect of it under theoldpractice being that awrit of trespasswould lie for the entryor seizure
itself, instead of a writ of trespass or of case for the subsequent abuse only.”).
150
See, e.g., McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 98–99 (1927) (declining to
apply the doctrine and explaining that its extension is disfavored); Bohlen & Shulman,
supra note 148, at 849 (“Certainly the fiction of trespass ab initio ought to be banished, at
least from the law of arrest.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 469 (1897) (“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past. I am thinking of the technical rule as to trespass ab initio . . . .”).
151
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 214 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.1965)
(“Since 1900 the weight of authority has rejected trespass ab initio, and there have been
very few cases in which it has been applied. The decisions rejecting it have been concerned
almost entirely with lawful arrest followed by tortious conduct on the part of the arresting
officer; but the number of decisions which have thus rejected the doctrine, and their
repudiation of the principle, indicates that it will no longer be accepted in cases of entry on
land, which there is no good reason to distinguish.”).
152
Id. (Reporter’s Notes) (“This Section has been changed from the first Restatement
by reversing the position taken in Subsection (2), and rejecting the doctrine of trespass ab initio,
as applied to privileged entries on land followed by subsequentmisconduct.”).
153
See infra Part III.
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as a whole.
154
They may even condition access on behavior.
155
For
example, an owner might welcome the Fightin’ Phils to a holiday
party but condition their access on not throwing anything at
Santa Claus.
Unambiguous prior notice differentiates these conditions
from otherwise impermissible access and use restrictions. Under the
current CFAA contractual approaches, whenever an ambiguous
contractual clause provides the necessary hook, system owners and
the federal government each get a free-floating license to levy civil
and criminal penalties.
156
By contrast, permissible restrictions come
up-front and reasonably communicate expectations; laws governing
“no trespassing” signs play some role in setting standards here, as
discussed in Part III.
Of course, owners need not post up-front notices when the
conduct plainly flouts authorization norms. If an intruder uses a
stolen password to bypass an authentication gate, then they are
“without authorization,” regardless of what messages the owner
has posted. Some scholars suggest that such authentication gates
provide the only method for owners to adequately signpost their
prohibition.
157
D. The Code-Based Approach
Scholars have long expressed concern with laws that
would give system and website owners the ability to Balkanize
the web. Some have pushed to limit owners’ authority to enforce
traditional rules like trespass or intellectual property
infringement. To that end, some scholars argue that a user only
bears liability for unauthorized access when bypassing an
authentication gate like a username/password prompt. This is a
mistake. It conflicts with Congress’ will that system owners
decide authorization. It also deprives system owners of legal
tools. Paradoxically, this may push those owners to adopt
technical tools that will exclude more users, rather than focusing
their effort on truly bad actors.
Before the explosion in CFAA litigation, scholars first
saw storm clouds in cyber-trespass litigation.
158
They forecasted
154
See infra Part III.
155
See infra Part III.
156
See supra Sections II.B, II.C.
157
See infra Section II.D.
158
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 27, 32 (2000) (detailing the mixed experience with using trespass to chattels for
computer misuse) (“[T]he claim of ‘trespass’ is mutating from an innovative claim to
deter commercial spam into a more general claim to deter unwanted messages.”);
O’Rourke, supra note 120, at 304–05 (“[S]ome courts have mutated the traditional
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that aggressive website owners would strangle internet speech
and commerce, creating an “‘anti-commons,’ in which property
rights are so finely divided that it becomes essentially impossible
to conduct any type of business.”
159
Even though that prediction
has not been borne out, recent articles have raised similar
concerns about the CFAA.
160
Others have raised the concern that
broad controls for user behavior under the CFAA turn the
statute into a malleable mess that regulates everything from
employee laziness to trade secret theft.
161
To prevent these problems, some scholars suggest that
users should only be deemed “without authorization” where they
bypass a code-based barrier like a username/password gate.
162
Any
more ambiguous barrier—like terms of service, IP blocks,
163
or even
trespass to chattels tort into a strict liability regime that allowsWeb site owners to enjoin
harmless intrusions.”).
159
Burk, supra note 158, at 49.
160
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 13, at 1163 (“Sellers who want to keep people out,
backed by the authority of criminal trespass law, shouldn’t set up shop at a public fair.
Similarly, companies that want to keep people from visiting their websites shouldn’t
connect a web server to the Internet and configure it so that it responds to every request.
By choosing to participate in the open Web, the website owner must accept the open
trespass norms of the Web.”); Marissa Boulanger, Note, Scraping the Bottom of the Barrel:
Why It Is No Surprise That Data Scrapers Can Have Access to Public Profiles on LinkedIn,
21 S.M.U. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 77, 85 (2018) (“[I]t seems to be a rather common sense
conclusion that was never explicitly touched upon by courts—what is public is public.”).
161
See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 35, at 528 (“All theories of interpreting
authorization under the CFAA other than code-based theory will create opportunities for
employers or prosecutors to use the CFAA to cover misappropriation-type claims as well
as potential employee frolic claims under the CFAA.”).
162
See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia,Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164,
2173 (2004) (“I . . . demonstrate that courts should apply the [CFAA] only when a system
owner uses strong technical measures to control access, and argue that courts have too
broadly interpreted that statute by allowing system owners to invoke it to enforce terms
of use and other weak forms of notice.”); Bellia, supra note 48, at 1475 (“[A] code-based
approach to the CFAA offers a number of advantages.”); Kerr, supra note 13, at 1164 (“In
my view, an authentication requirement draws the proper line.”); Patterson, supra note
35, at 528 (“[C]ourts should expressly adopt a code-based approach to [the CFAA’s]
interpretation.”). But see Mayer, supra note 137, at 1670 (“There is much to commend
the code-based standard of liability, for example, and the Author’s own preference is that
Congress implement a version of that approach. . . . Much as the code-based test holds
appeal, it simply cannot be squared with the statute.”).
163
IP addresses are (very loosely) like phone numbers for the internet. At any
given time, they tell another computer how to get a message to you. See IP Address,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_address [https://perma.cc/57H8-J793]. IP
blocks are like caller ID blocks. If your IP address matches an entry on a website’s block
list, then you can’t visit that website. See IP Address Blocking, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_address_blocking [https://perma.cc/ZUQ5-YRD8].
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CAPTCHAs
164
designed to turn away bots—“should be construed
as insufficient to overcome the open nature of the Web.”
165
Until very recently, no court had accepted the code-based
approach for the CFAA.
166
The Ninth Circuit just changed that,
though it took a circuitous path to this point. Back in 2012, the
Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Nosal I first nodded toward the
code-based approach by suggesting in dicta that only
circumventing restrictions like password gates would suffice to
trigger CFAA liability.
167
But without a clear holding to that effect,
several lower courts broadened CFAA liability, adopting roughly
the access contract approach.
168
When the Ninth Circuit’s later
164
CAPTCHAs are (very easy) puzzles designed to deter bots. They often
require typing the letters or numbers that appear in an image. If you can’t complete the
test, the website assumes you are a bot and turns you away. See CAPTCHA, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAPTCHA [https://perma.cc/JJ7A-NA9Y].
165
Kerr, supra note 13, at 1164. The code-based approach draws its legitimacy
from clarity; it seems that everyone should understand when they have bypassed a code-
based barrier. But as Professor James Grimmelmann points out, not all code-based
barriers are so straightforward. He points to a fascinating case from Australia where a
defendant obtained money from the ATM despite having insufficient funds in his
account. Because the ATM was offline and could not check balances, it was hard-coded
not to withhold funds. The defendant argued that either the ATM itself or the developers
that programmed it had consented by permitting the withdrawal even though they could
not knowwhether the balance was sufficient. See James Grimmelmann,Computer Crime
Law Goes to the Casino, LABORATORIUM (May 2, 2013), http://laboratorium.net/archive/
2013/05/02/computer_crime_law_goes_to_the_casino [https://perma.cc/75H6-U5P7].
166
See The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Circuit Split and Efforts to Amend,
BERKLEYTECH. L.J. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2014), http://btlj.org/2014/03/the-computer-fraud-and-
abuse-act-circuit-split-and-efforts-to-amend/ [https://perma.cc/B3HP-4PXG] (“No court has
adopted the code-based interpretation of the CFAA.”). While interpreting state statutes,
some lower courts have adopted code-based positions. See, e.g., In re Facebook Privacy
Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 715–16 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc.,
No. C 08-05780-JW, 2010 WL 3291750, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010). But seeWeingand
v. Harland Fin. Sols., Inc., No. C-11-3109, 2012 WL 2327660, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 19,
2012) (declining to adopt the code-based approach for the same statute at litigation’s outset,
though not foreclosing later motions based on a more developed record). And it has been
argued that one of the earliest computer trespass cases—United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d
504 (2d Cir. 1991)—“invoked a close analogue to the code-based interpretation.” Katherine
Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees’ Authorization
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 825 (2009). But the
Morris holding is difficult to analogize because it dealt with a computer worm or virus. See
Morris, 928 F.2d at 505.
167
See Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“[The CFAA’s] general
purpose is to punish hacking—the circumvention of technological access barriers—not
misappropriation of trade secrets . . . .”).
168
See, e.g., Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(acknowledging that access restrictions in terms of use might validly trigger the CFAA, but
declining to resolve the question because the terms at issuewere not “true” access restrictions,
but only use restrictions); Weingand v. Harland Fin. Sols., Inc., No. C-11-3109, 2012 WL
2327660, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2012) (“[A]lthough Nosal clearly precluded applying the
CFAA to violating restrictions on use, it did not preclude applying the CFAA to rules
regarding access.”); see also QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d 576, 597 (E.D. Pa.
2016) (“[T]he Court can plausibly infer that the QVC Publisher Agreement prohibits web-
crawling and that Resultly was alerted to that prohibition. . . . Accordingly, . . . the Court can
plausibly infer that Resultly acted ‘without authorization’ when it crawled QVC’s website.”).
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opinions in Nosal II and Power Ventures each found liability
beyond authentication circumvention, it appeared that the Court
of Appeals had ratified these lower-court interpretations.
169
But in
a very recent opinion from HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., the
Ninth Circuit has tightened its standard for CFAA liability,
adopting the position that liability only attaches when one
bypasses an authentication gate.
170
HiQ Labs reinterprets both Nosal II and Power Ventures,
concluding that when a system owner notifies a user that its
access has been revoked, the system owner does not (and
seemingly cannot) prohibit access to portions of the website
located outside an authentication gate.
171
Rather, the system
owner’s cease-and-desist prohibits the user from creating new
accounts or using an existing account to reach through an
authentication gate.
172
Indeed, it appears that the authentication
gate becomes virtually the only relevant fact, without regard to
whether the pages are actually accessible to the public. In Power
Ventures, Facebook placed pages behind an authentication gate
that any person could circumvent with a free, easy-to-create
account;
173
the Ninth Circuit permitted a cease-and-desist to bar
circumventing even that ephemeral gate.
174
Apparently the
(questionable) authentication gate is the only thing that matters.
But despite the Ninth Circuit’s recent endorsement,
Congress never intended the CFAA to focus so narrowly. In drafting
the statute, Congress could have used the word “authentication,” or
they could have mentioned username/password gates. Those
concepts were well understood and broadly accepted in computer
169
See Nosal II, 844 F.3d 1024, 1033–41 (9th Cir. 2016); Facebook, Inc. v. Power
Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1067, 1067 n.1 (9th Cir. 2016) (“distill[ing] two general
rules”: system owners may revoke access and terms of use violations are not enough, and
acknowledging but declining to resolve tension between these principles where “an
automatic boilerplate revocation follows a violation of a website’s terms of use”). But see
Jamie L. Williams, Automation Is Not “Hacking”: Why Courts Must Reject Attempts to Use
the CFAA as an Anti-Competitive Sword, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 416, 427 (2018)
(“[B]ecause both [Power Ventures and Nosal II] involved conduct the respective panels did
not like, they contortedNosal I’s clear holding to ensure that the defendants did not escape
CFAA liability . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
170
See HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1001 (9th Cir. 2019)
(suggesting that “authorization is only required for password-protected sites or sites that
otherwise prevent the general public from viewing the information”).
171
Id. at 1002–03.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 1002 (“Power Ventures was gathering user data that was protected by
Facebook’s username and password authentication system . . . .”).
174
Id. (“After Facebook sent a cease-and-desist letter, Power Ventures
continued to circumvent IP barriers and gain access to password-protected Facebook
member profiles. We held that after receiving an individualized cease-and-desist letter,
Power Ventures had accessed Facebook computers ‘without authorization’ and was
therefore liable under the CFAA.” (internal citations omitted)).
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security, even in 1984 and certainly as the CFAA was later
amended.
175
But code-based barriers go unmentioned in the statute.
Furthermore, neither “without authorization” nor “exceeds
authorized access” tends naturally to suggest a code-based
approach. As the Ninth Circuit explains in Brekka, the dictionary
defines “authorization” as “permission or power granted by an
authority.”
176
In WEC, the Fourth Circuit gives another dictionary
definition as “formal warrant, or sanction.”
177
Neither definition
requires that the system owner communicate authorization in any
particular manner.
Trespass precedents also counsel against this rigid rule.
178
Physical enclosure with a fence or locked door would provide the
equivalent to the electronic authentication gate. But the common
law permitted owners to recover for trespass not only to their
enclosed land, but also their adjacent unenclosed land.
179
Modern
statutes do not require enclosing land; they permit reasonable
notice in other forms.
180
In particular, statutes often detail how an
owner may post their land with “no trespassing” signs to provide
notice.
181
175
See, e.g., A Short History of the Computer Password, WELIVESECURITY (May
4, 2017), https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/05/04/short-history-computer-password/
[https://perma.cc/WA9S-5PLG] (discussing MIT developing the computer security
password in the 1960s). But at least one contemporaneous dictionary ties “authorization”
to usernames and passwords, which raises the plausible though unlikely suggestion that
Congress had such gates in mind when using that language. See JERRYM. ROSENBERG,
DICTIONARY OF COMPUTERS DATA PROCESSING AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 30 (1984)
(defining “authorization code” as “a code made up of user identification and password
used to protect against unauthorized access to data and system facilities”).
176
LVRC Holdings LCC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 139 (2001)); see also United States v. Valle,
807 F.3d 508, 524 (2d Cir. 2015) (same).
177
WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2012)
(quoting OXFORD ENGLISHDICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989, online version 2012)).
178
See, e.g., Goldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 13, at 1490 (“[T]hat meaning of
‘authorized’ [under the code-based approach] contradicts its recognized meaning in the
context of physical trespass, where barriers short of physical ones are nonetheless
capable of putting a would-be trespasser on notice.”).
179
BIGELOW, supra note 70, at 213 (“A man’s close includes not only his actually
enclosed land, but also all adjoining unenclosed lands held by him; and, if he is in possession
of any part of his premises, he is in possession of the whole . . . . The owner has the ‘power
of control’ and the ‘purpose to exercise the same’ for himself; he is therefore in a proper
position to recover damages for trespasses committed in any part of his premises, the
unenclosed as well as the enclosed. For example: The defendant, without permission, enters
and cuts timber in an open woodland of the plaintiff, adjoining a farm upon which the
plaintiff resides. The plaintiff is in possession of the woodland, and is entitled to recover.”
(footnotes omitted)); id. at 219 (“Any entry upon land in the rightful possession of another,
without license or permission, is a breach of duty to the possessor; and this too though the
land be unenclosed.”).
180
See, e.g., State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015, 1024 (Or. 1988) (“[I]f land is fenced,
posted or otherwise closed off, one does not enter it without permission . . . .”); Rayburn
v. State, 300 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ga. 1983) (holding that repeated warnings by police not to
enter train station conveyed required notice).
181
See infra Section III.B.
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Having considered how trespass precedents inform the
overall approaches currently considered by courts and scholars,
we can turn to how trespass precedents inform specific,
frequently encountered situations in the case law.
III. APPLYING TRESPASS PRECEDENT IN SPECIFIC CASES
Admittedly, difficulties arise in analogizing common law
trespass to modern electronic trespass. We must acknowledge
that trespass at common law referred to a broad “constellation
of related ideas.”
182
In Blackstone’s words, it could encompass
“any transgression or offence against the law of nature, of
society, or of the country in which we live; whether it relates to
a man’s person or his property.”
183
Treatises confirm that this
broad trespassory definition survived in American law. Treatise
authors devoted numerous chapters to trespass on the person,
which included assault, battery, and false imprisonment.
184
They
devoted similar space to trespass on personal property,
185
which
included hunting animals belonging to another and taking goods
belonging to another.
186
At some point, this broad trespass
definition contracted. By the time the CFAA was adopted in
1984, it appears that courts primarily used “trespass” to refer to
trespass upon land.
187
In that vein, Josh Goldfoot and Professor Aditya Bamzai
have recently presented evidence suggesting that Congress
intended to incorporate physical trespass law into CFAA
“authorization.”
188
Based on that conclusion, they construct a
workable general rule for authorization under the CFAA:
182
Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP.
CT. REV. 67, 90.
183
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *208.
184
See, e.g., 1 WATERMAN, supra note 70, at vi–vii.
185
See, e.g., id. at vii-ix.
186
See id. at 355, 358.
187
See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 175 (1984) (“In this case, the
officers had trespassed upon [the] defendant’s property . . . .”); Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d
503, 504 (Tex. 1984) (“In a suit for permanent damage to land, . . . the measure of damages is
the difference in the market value of the land immediately before and immediately after the
trespass.”); State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 747 (Minn. 1984) (“Appellants were arrested
at Honeywell corporate headquarters inMinneapolis and charged with trespassing.”); People
v. Leonard, 62N.Y.2d 404, 407 (1984) (“Defendantwas . . . charged . . . with criminal trespass
in the third degree for his allegedly unlawful presence on campus.”); State v. Ohling, 688 P.2d
1384, 1385 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he officers intruded onto the curtilage of defendant’s
dwelling. Their action was a trespass unless it was privileged or had defendant’s express or
implied consent.”).
188
See Goldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 13, at 1478–79, 1482. As they point out
themselves, this is not the first time this suggestion has arisen. Id. at 1482–83, 1483 n.22.
Indeed, in the earliest significant CFAA case, the Second Circuit referred repeatedly to the
CFAA as punishing “trespass.” See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir.
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[T]he “without authorization” trespass element is met when, as in
the case of physical trespass, a defendant (1) violates an express or
implied prohibition on entry or access (2) about which he knew or
should have known, and that (3) is material or related to access and
the underlying policy of trespass.
189
Thus far, though, neither scholars nor the courts have taken up
the work to apply trespass precedents to individual CFAA cases.
Indeed, Professor Orin Kerr has suggested that such precedents
are unworkable, and new precedents need to develop that
specifically address CFAA scenarios.
190
But the law has dealt for centuries with disputes over open
fields, public lands, and proprietor’s shops. The web imposes new
wrinkles, shifting traditional trespass paradigms, but not nearly
so far that they become inapplicable.
191
And even if the fit proves
imperfect, the courts have an obligation to try. As the Supreme
Court explains, Congress often mandates that courts incorporate
settled common-law principles into new packages: “[W]here
Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute
otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the
established meaning of these terms.”
192
The CFAA has most frequently been invoked in two
situations: (1) to punish trade secret theft by disloyal employees,
sometimes working with outside actors; and (2) to punish
website misuse in various forms.
1991). But for no clear reason, CFAA jurisprudence quickly wandered away from this
fundamental base.
189
Goldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 13, at 1479.
190
See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1157 (“Amidst this rapid technological change,
courts cannot merely invoke existing trespass norms to interpret authorization to access
a computer. It’s not clear any widely shared norms exist yet.”); see alsoCassandra Kirsch,
The Grey Hat Hacker: Reconciling Cyberspace Reality and the Law, 41 N. KY. L. REV.
383, 393 (2014) (“The broad language of the CFAA is a result of out-dated Internet
philosophies from before the Internet’s omnipresence in society. Congress rooted the
statute in common-law trespass doctrines . . . . However, common law property doctrine
is difficult to apply in situations such as the recent Auernheimer case.”).
191
SeeGoldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 13, at 1499 (“Precedents on physical trespass
provide a richer and more nuanced set of doctrines than has been previously appreciated.
They allow courts to interpret the CFAA in a fair, predictable, and principled manner.”).
192
Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995) (quoting Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence
v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263
(1952) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition
andmeaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that
were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning fromwhich it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.”).
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A. The Disloyal Employee
The disloyal employee scenario provokes strong emotions.
193
It strikes a traditional trust relationship when a worker sneaks
around and steals valuable files, seeking to enrich themselves
while still drawing a paycheck from their victim. But courts should
refuse to bend the CFAA to punish disloyal employees. As
discussed previously regarding Citrin, trespass law provides no
basis for enforcing a duty of loyalty.
194
Adequate protections
already exist to remedy contracts breached and trade secrets
stolen. If an employee confines their trespass to systems they can
already access, then the CFAA should probably not apply.
Certainly, prosecutable cases exist. The CFAA could
punish an employee that lacks even a login for a particular
system, entering through a technical flaw or by stealing another
employee’s credentials.
195
The statute embraces punishing an
employee who accesses a confidential internal database that they
have no legitimate reason to use.
196
Trespass law agrees, as
“consent . . . to the actor’s presence on a part of the land does not
create a privilege to enter or remain on any other part.”
197
Preferably employers would festoon databases with pop-up
warnings or similar prohibition. Even better, employers could put
them behind authentication gates. But such warnings are
probably unnecessary. Employees know they shouldn’t be poking
around in the CEO’s files or in other workers’ pay records.
Three difficult scenarios crop up in the case law. The first
scenario arises when an employee passes confidential information
to the outsider. If the employee can normally access that data,
then the circuits split on whether the employee has violated the
CFAA.
198
Trespass precedents would hold the employee liable
193
See, e.g., United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The
question on this appeal is . . . not whether Agrawal is a thief. He is.”).
194
See supra Section II.A.
195
Despite their employee status, there seems no reason to treat them differently
than any outside hacker that behaves similarly. Thus, they should be liable not just for
“exceed[ing] authorized access,” but for access “without authorization.” 18U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
196
See Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“‘[E]xceeds authorized
access’ would refer to data or files on a computer that one is not authorized to access”).
197
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 169 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also
McCusker v. Mitchell, 36 A. 1123, 1124 (R.I. 1897) (“It is very clear that a license to go upon
one’s land for a certain distance gives the licensee no right to go beyond that distance, or to
do anything not specified in the license.”); Taylor v. Whitehead (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 475,
475 (“It is not a good justification in trespass, that the defendant has a right of way over
part of the plaintiff ’ s land, and that he had gone upon the adjoining land, because the way
was impassable from being overflowed by a river.”).
198
CompareUnited States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010) (employee liable),
andEFCultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001) (employee liable),
withWEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012) (employee not
liable), and Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (employee not liable).
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under at least some circumstances. As the Restatement explains,
a person licensed to enter cannot circumvent prohibitions levied
against others:
A grants permission to B, his neighbor, to enter A’s land and draw
water from A’s spring for B’s own use. A has specifically refused
permission to C to enter A’s land and draw water from the spring. At
C’s instigation, B enters A’s land and obtains for C water from the
spring. B’s entry is a trespass.
199
But applying this trespass precedent to the CFAA would
destroy the distinction between access and use. As discussed above,
at least the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded
that the CFAA prohibits only improper access, not improper use.
200
These statutory arguments are persuasive; when clearly contrary,
the statute overrides common law understandings.
The second difficult scenario arises when an employee uses
a database in their day-to-day duties but veers into prohibited
territory by accessing records they shouldn’t. No easy answer
exists. Prohibitions on access and use blur into each other.
Warnings may or may not give sufficient notice, depending on the
individual case. United States v. Rodriguez provides a good
example for punishment under the CFAA.
201
Rodriguez received
ample warning that he should not access Social Security files for
personal purposes. He was told repeatedly that he should access
only files related to his official obligations, through “mandatory
training sessions, notices posted in the office, and a banner that
appeared on every computer screen daily.”
202
One can also infer
that the files were clearly separated, presumably by Social Security
number or similar identifier. Further, Rodriguez’s duties, which
“included answering questions of the general public about social
security benefits,” presumably provided clear boundaries about
which files he needed to access.
203
A call might trigger Rodriguez to
pull up the caller’s file or a file about their dependents or others in
their household. It would not reasonably require pulling up a file
for someone in the next building, street, or town.
The third difficult scenario questions whether to punish
an outside actor that induces the disloyal employee to steal
secrets. Again, this splits the circuits. The principal split falls as
expected: Courts willing to punish the employee have had little
199
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 168 cmt. d, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1934);
see also 9 BACON, supra note 70, at 492 (“If A command or request B to take the goods of
C, and B do it, this action lies as well against A as against B.”).
200
See supra Section II.B.
201
United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).
202
Id. at 1260.
203
Id.
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difficulty punishing their puppeteer,
204
while courts declining to
punish the employee have likewise refused to punish the outside
instigator.
205
But the Ninth Circuit has proven a surprising
outlier in this split. Even though it declined to punish the
disloyal employees in Nosal II, it had no trouble punishing the
outside actor pulling their strings.
206
Surprisingly, this final
position seems most consistent with trespass precedent. As
suggested above, licenses can be personal, with authorization
that does not chain from party to party.
207
Courts can punish
parties for inducing others to trespass.
208
Indeed, by accepting
stolen goods, one can even ratify the trespass after the fact,
which results in trespass liability.
209
Taken together, these
204
See, e.g., Se. Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Brody, No. 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, 2008
WL 4613046, at *14 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2008) (“Although Babcock, TEI, Maliszewski, and
Naughton may not have accessed SMS’s computers, the e-mail communications among
the Defendants supports SMS’s assertions that Babcock, TEI, Maliszewski and
Naughton implicitly induced and/or encouraged Brody, Sherouse, and Smith to access
and use SMS’s information without authorization.”).
205
See WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir.
2012) (holding that the outsider “cannot be liable under the statute for any role it played
in encouraging such conduct”).
206
See Nosal II, 844 F.3d 1024, 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. v. Sandhu, 291 F. Supp. 3d 659, 671 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“[B]ecause [insider]
Sandhu did not obtain the information at issue without authorization or beyond her
authorized access, we shall dismiss the CFAA claim against her. Outsiders, like Apotex
and Desai, are not treated the same as insiders. Rather, they are akin to hackers, those
the CFAA aimed to hold criminally and civilly liable. They did not have authority to
access the computers. But, they indirectly accessed Teva’s protected computers through
one who had the authority.”).
207
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 168 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1934)
(“Although ordinarily one to whom consent is given to enter land for a particular purpose
may delegate his privilege to a servant or deputy, the license may be a purely personal
one. In such case, if the licensee causes a third person to enter the land, both he and the
third person are trespassers.”).
208
See 9 BACON, supra note 70, at 492 (“If A command or request B to take the
goods of C, and B do it, this action lies as well against A as against B.”); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *429–30 (“[I]f the servant commit a trespass by the
command or encouragement of his master, the master shall be guilty of it: though the
servant is not thereby excused, for he is only to obey his master in matters that are
honest and lawful.”); 1 WATERMAN, supra note 70, at 42 (“[T]he liability of the master for
the acts of his servant depends upon whether the servant at the time, and in the
particular in question, was acting under and in execution of authority from the master;
in which case the master is responsible.”).
209
75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 58, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019) (“A
person may be liable for causing someone else to commit a trespass. All persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid, or abet
the commission of a trespass, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit,
are cotrespassers [sic] . . . .”); 9 BACON, supra note 70, at 492 (“If J S agree to a trespass
which has been committed by J N for his benefit, this action lies against J S, although it
was not done in obedience to his command, or at his request.”); 1 WATERMAN, supra note
70, at 27 (“A thing done for another by a person not assuming to act for himself, but for
such other person, though without any precedent authority whatever, becomes the act of
the principal, if subsequently ratified by him. . . . Sir Edward Coke says: ‘He that
receiveth a trespasser and agrees to a trespass after it is done, is no trespasser, unless
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principles indicate that the courts should hold liable an outsider
who induces an insider with access to trespass on his behalf.
B. General Rules for Website Trespass
One would think that websites would prove difficult to
analogize to centuries-old trespass law. But precedents applying
to public resources rank among the oldest and most well-
established. Even the near-absolute property rights in English
common law yielded to established public norms. English courts
declaimed cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad caelum et ad
inferos
210
: “To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the
sky and to the depths.”
211
With absolute ownership came
absolute right to exclude. Under English common law, “[e]very
entry upon the land of another without lawful authority is a
trespass, though only the grass be trodden.”
212
Yet those opening
their establishments to the public must accept that the public
would enter them. As Blackstone explains: “[A] man may justify
entering into an inn or public house without the leave of the
owner first specially asked, because when a man professes the
keeping such inn or public house he thereby gives a general
license to any person to enter his doors.”
213
Modern law agrees;
214
the Supreme Court has held that even private homes bear an
the trespass was done for his use, or for his benefit, and then his agreement subsequent
amounteth to a precedent commandment.’” (citations and footnotes omitted)).
210
See, e.g., Doe v. Burt, (1787) 99 Eng. Rep. 1330, 1330; see also John G.
Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 982–90 (2008)
(tracing maxim’s history). Modern law has stepped away from this approach. See United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946) (“[The cujus est solum] doctrine has no
place in the modern world.”).
211
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (2d ed. 1910), https://books.google.com/book
s?id=R2c8AAAAIAAJ.
212
2 WATERMAN, supra note 70, at 219.
213
2WILLIAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *212; see also BIGELOW, supra note
70, at 221–25 (“The term ‘license of the law’ has reference to cases in which a permission
is given regardless of the will of the owner or occupant, and includes all other cases in
which the entry or taking possession was lawful. It includes, therefore, certain cases in
which, in point of fact, there may at the same time be a license of the party; as e.g. in the
case of an innkeeper, who both invites, and, generally speaking, must receive guests.”);
1 WATERMAN, supra note 70, at 154 (“As an innkeeper holds out his house as a public
place to which travelers may resort, he cannot prohibit persons who come in that
character, in a proper manner, and at suitable times, from entering, so long as he has
the means of accommodation for them.”).
214
See, e.g., 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 40, Westlaw (database updated Aug.
2019) (“Opening an establishment to transact business with the public is permission to
enter, unless forbidden.”); St. Louis County v. Stone, 776 S.W.2d 885, 888–89 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (“In such instance where a person enters a public or common area, there is
no intrusion or trespass because the person is clothed with the implied consent of the
owner or possessor of the property. It would be ludicrous for a member of the public to
seek out the expressed consent of the owner to enter an area already open to the public.”
(internal citations omitted)).
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implied license “to approach the home by the front path, knock
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation
to linger longer) leave.”
215
Inevitably, business owners will wish that certain patrons
had never darkened their doorstep. The hotel guest destroys their
room. The diner cannot pay for their meal. They are unwelcome.
They may even bear liability under other criminal or civil laws.
They are not trespassers.
216
Trespass laws do not leave business owners defenseless.
Guests must enter in a reasonable manner and leave when the
owner asks.
217
The right to walk in a shop’s front door does not
imply the right to drive through it in a tank.
218
If the owner posts
a sign saying “You may not enter without wearing a funny hat,”
you’d better work on your haberdashery.
219
The right to enter
215
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013).
216
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *213 (“[A] bare non-feasance, as
not paying for the wine he calls for, will not make him a trespasser; for this is only a
breach of contract, for which the taverner shall have an action of debt or assumpsit
against him.”); see Goldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 13, at 1495 (“[F]or a violation of an
express or implied prohibition to constitute a criminal trespass, it must advance the
rationale for the crime of trespass.”).
217
See, e.g., 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 40, Westlaw (database updated Aug.
2019) (“Once the proprietor requests that a person leave, that individual has no legal
right to remain.”).
218
SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTORTS § 214(1) (AMLAW INST. 1965) (“An actor
who has in an unreasonable manner exercised any privilege to enter land is subject to
liability for any harm to a legally protected interest of another caused by such unreasonable
conduct.”); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 40, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019) (“An
invitation to conduct business presupposes that the conduct of persons coming to the
premises will be in keeping with that purpose.”); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 51, Westlaw
(database updated Aug. 2019) (“Although a person who enters an area open to the public
at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner has the implied consent of the owner to
enter the premises under a limited privilege, substantial evidence of the stay being
prolonged, boisterous conduct, breach of the peace, blocking the entranceways, interference
with the public, picketing, or other conduct which would revoke the implied consent of the
owner by acts inconsistent with the purposes of the business or facility, causes a trespass.”);
75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 53, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019) (“An actor who has,
in an unreasonable manner, exercised any privilege to enter land is subject to liability for
any harm to a legally protected interest of another caused by that unreasonable conduct.”).
219
SeeRESTATEMENT (FIRST)OFTORTS§ 168 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (“A conditional
or restricted consent to enter land creates a privilege to do so only in so far as the condition
or restriction is complied with.”); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 51, Westlaw (database updated
Aug. 2019) (“A trespass may occur if the party, entering pursuant to a limited consent, i.e.,
limited as to purpose or place, proceeds to exceed those limits by divergent conduct on the
land of another, as a conditional or restricted consent to enter land creates a privilege to do
so only in so far as the condition or restriction is complied with.”); Lothar Determann,
Internet Freedom andComputer Abuse, 35HASTINGSCOMM.&ENT. L.J. 429, 443–44 (2013)
(“[P]roperty owners were always able to some degree to define limitations on authorizations
in a number of different ways, including the following: They can grant authorization subject
to conditions precedent. . . . They can also grant authorization subject to continued
conditions. . . . The property owner can also grant authorization subject to
limitations . . . .”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103
N.W.U.L.REV. 1823, 1855 (2009) (“The right to exclude entitles the owner not only to block
another person’s entry to her property entirely but also to grant her conditional entry. The
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does not prevent an owner from ejecting you and barring your
future entry.
220
From these precedents, this article suggests three general
rules. First, access methods substantially out of step with web
norms
221
or explicitly banned by the website owner
222
would lack
authorization. On the norms side, bypassing authentication
gates, as under the code-based approach, would obviously lack
authorization.
223
Denial-of-service attacks—designed to slow or
crash a site and thereby render it inaccessible—would likewise
lack authorization.
224
On thewebsite owner’s side, communicating
prohibited access methods could be accomplished through a
robots.txt file (for scrapers),
225
a pop-up (for regular users), or a
cease-and-desist letter (for either).
Second, an owner can tell specific users they are unwelcome
in the first place. The owner can accomplish this through a pop-up,
a cease-and-desist letter,
226
an IP block combined with another
owner can set countless conditions for another person’s entry to her property, as well as
notify any entrant, expressly or implicitly, that violation of any of those conditions would
make him an unwanted trespasser.”).
220
See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,
1024 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (“[Defendants argue] that because an establishment invites the
public to enter its property for business purposes, it cannot later restrict or revoke access
to that property, a proposition which is erroneous under Ohio law.”); 1 WATERMAN, supra
note 70, at 152 (“[I]f a person . . . refuses to leave the shop, after being requested by the
shopkeeper or his servants, he may be ejected.”); id. at 154 (“[An innkeeper] is not obliged
to make his house a common receptacle for all comers, whatever may be their character
or condition. He is not obliged to receive one who is not able to pay for his
entertainment. . . . [H]e is not bound to admit one whose notorious character as a thief
furnishes good reason to suppose that he will purloin the goods of his guests, or his
own. . . . [He] may exclude common brawlers, and any one who comes with intent to
commit an assault or make an affray. . . . He has a right to prohibit idle persons and
common drunkards from entering, and to require them and the others before mentioned
to depart if they have already entered.”).
221
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
222
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
223
See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 51, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019)
(“[L]eaving the public premises of a business to venture into a posted nonpublic area
changes an invitee into a trespasser.”).
224
See, e.g., Tyco Int’l (US) Inc. v. Does, No. 01 Civ. 3856, 2003 WL 23374767,
at *2–3, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2003) (recommending injunction and nominal damages
under CFAA for denial-of-service attack); see also United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504,
510–11 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming CFAA violation for exploiting bugs and bypassing
password gates that also had a denial-of-service effect).
225
For an explanation of scrapers and their configuration, see infra notes 271-
277 and accompanying text.
226
See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir.
2016) (“We also hold that Power violated the CFAA and California Penal Code section
502 only after it received Facebook’s cease and desist letter and nonetheless continued
to access Facebook’s computers without permission.”).
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more definite notice method,
227
or a suspended or disabled account
combined with another more definite notice method.
228
Finally, the owner can turn users away any time they
want. This rule plainly accords with trespass precedent. The
owner “has the right to determine whom to invite, the scope of the
invitation, and the circumstances under which the invitation may
be revoked.”
229
They can do so by providing reasonable notice to
the user that they are unwelcome. As with the up-front
prohibition, this can be accomplished through a pop-up, a cease-
and-desist letter, an IP block combined with another more
definite notice method, or a suspended or disabled account.
The question is not whether a property owner may restrict
access, but how they provide sufficient notice that they have
restricted access. In the real property context, revoking permission
often means telling someone directly that they must leave.
230
That
occasionally happens in the CFAA context, usually with cease-and-
desist letters. IP blocks and similarmethodsmay communicate the
same intent. But generally, the web’s open naturemakes it difficult
to single out specific trespassers to uninvite.
In the real property context, owners can also revoke
permission by posting a “No Trespassing” sign.
231
States
227
See id. at 1068 n.5 (“Simply bypassing an IP address, without more, would
not constitute unauthorized use. Because a blocked user does not receive notice that he
has been blocked, he may never realize that the block was imposed and that
authorization was revoked. Or, even if he does discover the block, he could conclude that
it was triggered by misconduct by someone else who shares the same IP address, such
as the user’s roommate or co-worker.”).
228
See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1174 (“[S]uspending an account withdraws
authorization to access the account. . . . [A] suspension may or may not signal that access
to additional accounts is prohibited.”).
229
75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 40, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019).
230
See, e.g., id. (“Once the proprietor requests that a person leave, that
individual has no legal right to remain.”); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350 (criminalizing
“fail[ing] to leave premises or in a propelled vehicle that is open to the public after being
lawfully directed to do so personally by the person in charge”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
1502 (criminalizing remaining “after a reasonable request to leave by a law enforcement
officer, the owner or any other person having lawful control”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-
101(3)(B)(i) (“A person who enters or remains in or upon premises that are at the time
open to the public does so with license and privilege, regardless of his or her purposes,
unless he or she defies a lawful order not to enter or remain . . . .”).
231
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350(b); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1502; ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-39-101(3)(B)(i); CAL. PENAL CODE § 602.8(a); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-814;
IDAHO CODE § 18-7008; IND. CODE § 35-43-2-2(c) & (d); 17 ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 17-A,
§ 402(4)(A).
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sometimes specify size,
232
content,
233
cluster density,
234
and other
considerations. Florida provides a particularly detailed example,
with land considered posted where:
Signs are placed not more than 500 feet apart along, and at each
corner of, the boundaries of the land, upon which signs there appears
prominently, in letters of not less than 2 inches in height, the words
“no trespassing” and in addition thereto the name of the owner, lessee,
or occupant of said land. Said signs shall be placed along the boundary
line of posted land in a manner and in such position as to be clearly
noticeable from outside the boundary line.
235
But states rarely regulate signs with such detail. States often
permit posting in any reasonably conspicuous manner.
236
Similar notice rules should apply in the CFAA context.
Because neither the federal government nor the states have
legislated in this area, courts must apply some reasonable
boundaries. A simple, unambiguous message establishing that
an individual or recognizable group may not use the site should
bar access to those listed.
237
The message should require
affirmative acknowledgment (e.g., a click-thru) from the user.
The message should be provided with the acknowledgment
button, rather than on a separate, linked page. The website
owner should record the message content, the acknowledgment,
and pertinent details about the visitor (e.g., IP address, cookie
content, account name). A certified cease-and-desist letter would
provide similar assurance that notice was received. As discussed
below, other methods like IP blocks provide some evidence that
notice was received, but courts should not attach criminal
liability to these unless the website owner supplements them
with other methods.
232
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 810.011(5)(a)(1); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-814(1)(d)(ii)
(“letters no less than two inches in height”).
233
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 810.011(5)(a)(1); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-814(1)(d)(ii)
(“‘Private Property – No Trespassing’, ‘Government Property – No Trespassing’, or a
substantially similar message”); IDAHO CODE § 18-7008(2)(a) (“conspicuous ‘no
trespassing’ signs or bright orange or fluorescent paint”); IND. CODE § 35-43-2-2(c), (d)
(prescribed sign, sign likely to come to public’s attention, or purple marks); 17 ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 17-A, § 402(4)(A) (“Signs must indicate that access is prohibited, that access is
prohibited without permission of the landowner or the landowner’s agent, or that access
for a particular purpose is prohibited. . . . [Specified paint marking may also be used].”).
234
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 602.8 (“not less than three to the mile”); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 708-814(1)(d)(ii) (“no less than three signs to a mile”); IND. CODE § 35-43-2-2
(purple marks on trees no more than a hundred feet apart or posts no more than thirty-six
feet apart); 17 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 402(4)(C) (“intervals no greater than 100 feet”).
235
FLA. STAT. § 810.011(5)(a)(1).
236
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350 (“a reasonably conspicuous manner under
the circumstances”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1502 (“reasonable notice prohibiting entry”);
ARK. CODEANN. § 5-39-101(3)(C)(ii) (“posting in a conspicuous manner”).
237
Obviously, the recognizable group cannot be a class protected by federal or
state anti-discrimination laws.
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This notice approach generally accords with an early
CFAA case.
238
In EF Cultural Travel Corp. BV v. Zefer Corp., the
First Circuit declined to hold that a website owner could forbid
scrapers under the CFAA absent clear notice:
[The website owner] could easily include . . . a sentence on its
home page or in its terms of use stating that “no scrapers may be
used,” giving fair warning and avoiding time-consuming
litigation . . . .
. . . .
. . . [W]ith rare exceptions, public website providers ought to say
just what non-password protected access they purport to forbid.
239
The approach advocated here would differ from Zefer in
that website owners should not bury these vital notices in terms
of service.
With these principles in mind, we can address some
scenarios repeatedly encountered by the courts.
1. The Denial-of-Service Attacker
Denial-of-service attacks make computer systems
unavailable to legitimate users.
240
These attacks take many
forms, including spam e-mail barrages or webpage request
deluges.
241
Several cases have tried to apply the CFAA to denial-
of-service attacks, generally under two theories: unauthorized
damage and unauthorized access. The damage theory arises
from 18 U.S.C.§ 1030(a)(5)(A), which prohibits “knowingly
caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code, or
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes
damage without authorization, to a protected computer.”
242
The
access theory arises from the familiar 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2),
which prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a protected computer
without authorization.”
243
Notably, these provisions differ in
238
In any other legal area, a case coming almost two decades after the statute’s
enactment would not be considered an “early” case, but CFAA development has been
surprisingly slow.
239
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2003).
240
See NCCIC, U.S. Comput. Emergency Response Team, Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., Security Tip (ST04-015) Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks, (June 28, 2018),
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015 [https://perma.cc/52RK-C78N] (“A denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks occurs when legitimate users are unable to access information
systems, devices, or other network resources due to the actions of a malicious cyber
threat actor.”).
241
See id. (“A denial-of-service is accomplished by flooding the targeted host or
network with traffic until the target cannot respond or simply crashes.”).
242
18 U.S.C.§ 1030(a)(5)(A).
243
18 U.S.C.§ 1030(a)(2).
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what requires authorization. While (a)(2) prohibits access
without authorization, (a)(5)(A) prohibits damage without
authorization.
244
The limited precedent uniformly treats denial-of-service
attacks as unauthorized damage.
245
For example, in United States
v. Carlson, the Third Circuit affirmed an (a)(5)(A) conviction
against a Philadelphia Phillies fan that used spoofed e-mail
addresses to flood the team’s front office with messages criticizing
their management decisions.
246
He clogged inboxes, caused delays,
and sometimes required purging both spam and legitimate e-mails
to solve the problem.
247
Similarly, in Pulte Homes, a labor union
mounted a protest by employing both automated systems and
union members to spam employer Pulte Homes with e-mail and
phone calls.
248
The calls clogged Pulte’s voicemail system and cut it
off from customers.
249
“The e-mails wreaked more havoc: they
overloaded Pulte’s system . . . and . . . stalled normal business
operations because Pulte’s employees could not access business-
related e-mails or send e-mails to customers and vendors.”
250
The
Sixth Circuit held this sufficient for an (a)(5)(A) claim.
251
But the Sixth Circuit rejected the companion (a)(2) claim.
While concluding the damage was unauthorized, it held the access
authorized because the phone and e-mail systems were open to the
public.
252
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the statute mandated
244
See ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 108 (4th ed. 2018) (“Note that the
absence of authorization does not refer to the access, but rather to causing damage.”).
One may reasonably ask why anyone would grant authorization for damage. Obviously,
penetration testers and other security professionals may need permission for potentially
destructive testing to confirm system or network security. But because damage is defined
by the statute as “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(e)(8), it could also include routine maintenance tasks like encrypting files or
modifying their permissions.
245
See, e.g., Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union N. Am., 648 F.3d 295,
301–03 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Carlson, 209 F. App’x 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2006);
United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2005); BHRAC, LLC v. Regency
Car Rentals, LLC, No. CV 15-865, 2015 WL 3561671, at *1–4 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2015);
Tyco Int’l (US) Inc. v. Does, No. 01 Civ. 3856, 2003 WL 23374767 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29,
2003); see also Ebates, Inc. v. Does, No. 16-cv-01925, 2016 WL 2344199 (N.D. Cal. May
3, 2016) (declining to decide whether Ebates pleaded a plausible CFAA claim for DDOS
attack, but finding a prima facie showing).
246
See Carlson, 209 F. App’x at 182–83.
247
Id. at 184.
248
See Pulte Homes, 648 F.3d at 298–99, 301–03.
249
Id. at 299.
250
Id. at 299.
251
Id. at 301–03.
252
Id. at 304 (“LIUNA used unprotected public communications systems, which
defeats Pulte’s allegation that LIUNA accessed its computers ‘without authorization.’
Pulte allows all members of the public to contact its offices and executives: it does not
allege, for example, that LIUNA, or anyone else, needs a password or code to call or e-
mail its business.”).
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this view.
253
While Congress never defined “without authorization,”
Congress did define “exceeds authorized access.” That definition—
“access[ing] a computer with authorization and . . . us[ing] such
access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the
accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter”
254
—necessarily
captures all the caseswhere an intruder has authorization but does
something untoward. And it regulates only “obtain[ing] or
alter[ing] information.” It does not regulate the methods used.
255
Absent this statutory limit, trespass precedents favor
treating situations like Carlson and Pulte as unauthorized access.
Even those with authorization must behave reasonably in
exercising it.
256
InUnited States ex rel. Horelick v. Criminal Court
of New York, the Second Circuit explained that a teacher
authorized to “go in the front door” does not gain a license “to
enter surreptitiously through a basement window.”
257
In Moonin
v. Nevada ex rel. Department of Public Safety, the District of
Nevada held that a privilege to remove a dog kennel did not
justify destroying the backyard fence in the process.
258
InBrutsche
v. City of Kent, the Washington Supreme Court held that when
“officers executing a search warrant unnecessarily damage the
property while conducting their search . . . liability in trespass
can result.”
259
Numerous other cases attest to this.
260
But the
statute reigns supreme.
There is no question that a denial-of-service attack is an
unreasonable method for accessing a website, and one could
argue that entering in an unreasonable manner taints the initial
authorization, making access unreasonable from the beginning.
But this seems a creative way to get around Congress’ textual
limitation on “exceed[ing] authorized access.” Trespass
precedent counsels a broad reading, but that reading can never
253
See id. at 303–04.
254
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
255
See Pulte Homes, 648 F.3d at 303–04; see also Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St.,
Inc. 879 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We hold that taking data using a method
prohibited by the applicable terms of use, when the taking itself generally is permitted,
does not violate the [California CFAA]. Because the same reasoning applies to the
[Nevada CFAA] claim, we reverse the judgment as to both claims.”).
256
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 214(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“An
actor who has in an unreasonable manner exercised any privilege to enter land is subject
to liability for any harm to a legally protected interest of another caused by such
unreasonable conduct.”); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 40, Westlaw (database updated Aug.
2019) (“An invitation to conduct business presupposes that the conduct of persons coming
to the premises will be in keeping with that purpose.”).
257
United States ex rel.Horelick v. Crim. Ct. N.Y., 507 F.2d 37, 41 (2d. Cir. 1974).
258
Moonin v.Nev. ex rel. Dep’t Pub. Safety, 960F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1145 (D.Nev. 2013).
259
Brutsche v. City of Kent, 193 P.3d 110, 116 (Wash. 2008).
260
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 214 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(collecting cases).
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exceed the statutory text. Denial-of-service attacks clearly
deserve punishment under the CFAA. But addressing them
under the damage provision accomplishes the right result. It fits
the offense better than mere access. And through its intent,
damage, and loss requirements, it likely forecloses applying the
CFAA to accidents (like a misconfigured scraper bot) that never
rise to real denial-of-service attacks.
2. The Web Scraper
The modern internet requires scrapers, automated bots
that play countless roles, including capturing websites for search
engines like Google and surveying prices for travel sites like
Kayak. Because they access many sites, sometimes for competing
companies, scrapers feature regularly in CFAA litigation. As
Andrew Sellars details in a comprehensive article, their
treatment has evolved along with CFAA precedent.
261
Early cases
suggested that virtually “any mechanism could be used to
determine that the scraper’s access was unauthorized.”
262
These
included use restrictions, terms of service violations, and express
warnings.
263
Then Brekka and Nosal I held that violating use
restrictions did not garner CFAA liability.
264
These decisions
catalyzed a shift toward a narrower reading, giving less weight to
website terms of service.
265
But CFAA plaintiffs adjusted their
aim and tried again, this time arguing that those failing to comply
with terms of service were not merely using the data improperly,
but had no right to access the site at all.
266
As Judge Breyer
summarizes in Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps Inc.: “[C]omputer owners
have the power to revoke the authorizations they grant.”
267
This accords with trespass precedent. Property owners
can revoke the licenses they grant.
268
The law should punish
scraper owners that ignore targeted cease-and-desist requests.
261
See Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years of Web Scraping and the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 372 (2018).
262
Id. at 393.
263
Id. at 394.
264
See Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“[W]e continue to
follow in the path blazed by Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, and the growing number of courts
that have reached the same conclusion. These courts recognize that the plain language
of the CFAA ‘target[s] the unauthorized procurement or alteration of information, not
its misuse or misappropriation.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Shamrock Foods
Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (D. Ariz. 2008))).
265
See Sellars, supra note 261, at 398–400.
266
See id. at 402–04.
267
Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
268
See supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text.
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Similar warnings like IP blocks may also suffice, depending on
the circumstances.
269
But what about the general rule advocated by this article
that brief, unambiguous pop-up messages can provide reasonable
notice? Problems arise when applying this approach to web
scrapers. Scrapers view websites differently than people.
270
Unlike humans, scrapers often cannot distinguish such notice
messages from other website content. Absent very specific,
unusual, and likely error-prone programming, scrapers cannot
parse these terms to distinguish permitted actions from
prohibited actions. For this reason, courts should not normally
treat click-thru messages as a notice to scrapers. (An exception
may apply if the scraper was specifically designed to bypass or
acknowledge the click-thru message.) But websites can use
methods to provide unambiguous notice to scrapers. These
include robots.txt usage and user-agent monitoring.
Robots.txt is a file placed at a website’s root directory.
271
It follows a standard format that automated systems can
understand.
272
It specifies what if any parts of the site automated
systems can access.
273
Because developers designed these
conventions for automated systems to understand, they are
unambiguous.
274
Scraper designers are encouraged to abide by
these rules.
275
Tech companies adhere to them.
276
Because they
provide unambiguous notice, courts might reasonably treat a
scraper that ignores them as operating without authorization.
277
269
See infra Section III.B.
270
See Sellars, supra note 261, at 387.
271
SeeM. Koster, AMethod for Web Robots Control (Internet Eng’g Task Force,
Working Paper, Dec. 4, 1996), http://www.robotstxt.org/norobots-rfc.txt [https://perma.
cc/HH4W-4HFN].
272
See id.
273
See id.
274
See Bellia, supra note 162, at 2215 (“The [robot exclusion] standard
nevertheless serves as a means to provide technical but very specific notice about
permissible uses of a system.”)
275
See KEVIN HEMENWAY & TARA CALISHAIN, SPIDERING HACKS 46 (2003) (“If
you’re planning on releasing your scraper or spider into the wild, it’s important that you
make every possible attempt to support robots.txt.”).
276
See Barry Schwartz, Robots.txt Celebrates 20 Years of Blocking Search
Engines, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 30, 2014), https://searchengineland.com/robots-
txt-celebrates-20-years-blocking-search-engines-195479 [https://perma.cc/B78J-9YAP]
(“All major search engines [in 1994], including WebCrawler, Lycos and AltaVista,
quickly adopted it; and even [twenty] years later, all major search engines continue to
support it and obey it.”).
277
Cf. Bellia, supra note 162, at 2215 (“The [robot exclusion] standard
nevertheless serves as a means to provide technical but very specific notice about
permissible uses of a system.”); Sellars, supra note 261, at 414 (discussing robots.txt and
encouraging its further consideration in the CFAA context, but acknowledging that no
courts “have gone so far as to suggest that it can be used to demonstrate authorized
access to a website”).
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Websites can also control access with user-agent
monitoring. User-agents are text strings that contain identifying
information, sent by a browser or scraper when connecting to a
website.
278
In response, websites can block the connection or send
back specific error messages.
279
Like robots.txt, these error
messages follow unambiguous programming conventions. They
include “401 Unauthorized” and “403 Forbidden.”
280
Scrapers
need not always provide an honest user-agent string. There are
legitimate reasons—like quality-control testing—why someone
might provide a spoofed (false) user-agent string. But if a scraper
receives an Unauthorized or Forbidden message, then modifies
the user-agent string to bypass that message, courts should
consider their access without authorization.
Robots.txt and HTTP error messages provide owners with
certain unambiguous conventions to communicate to scrapers
that they lack CFAA authorization. But it should give anyone
pause that “a tremendous number of [CFAA opinions involving
web scrapers] concern claims brought by direct commercial
competitors or companies in closely adjacent markets.”
281
The
CFAA should not provide companies with a tool to lock out their
competitors in ways that hurt the free market. For example, by
preventing bots from surveying comparable prices, companies
keep prices artificially high.
282
Executive agencies like the FTC
and DOJ could punish scraper exclusion as unfair competition or
an antitrust violation. Alternatively, Congress could craft a safe
harbor that exempts scraping from the CFAA.
278
See User-Agent, MOZILLA, https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HT
TP/Headers/User-Agent [https://perma.cc/WH22-B9RL] (“The User-Agent request header
contains a characteristic string that allows the network protocol peers to identify the
application type, operating system, software vendor or software version of the requesting
software user agent.”); see also QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 525, 530 (E.D.
Pa. 2015) (“A user agent is a ‘string’ that is passed by a browser or other device, to a website,
to identify what software is being used by that device to access the site.”).
279
See Jeff Starr, Example of a Spoofed Search Engine Bot, PERISHABLE PRESS,
https://perishablepress.com/spoofed-search-engine-bot/ [https://perma.cc/FF6J-H45F]
(explaining how to review user agent and related information and block bots).
280
10 Status Code Definitions, W3C, https://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc
2616-sec10.html [https://perma.cc/6VV3-HBNL].
281
Sellars, supra note 261, at 390 (footnote omitted).
282
Some companies sell technical tools to filter and block scrapers, and they freely
admit that scrapers generally pull down prices overall, which they want to avoid. See, e.g.,
Elias Terman, Five Ways Your Competition Is Using Price Scraping Bots on Your E-
Commerce Site, DISTIL NETWORKS, https://resources.distilnetworks.com/all-blog-posts/pri
ce-scraping [https://perma.cc/JYB7-WSJE] (“[B]ad actors seek to scrape information from
legitimate online retail sites to gain product and pricing intelligence that can be used to
undercut their pricing or position against their offerings.”).
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3. The IP-Blocked User
IP Address blocking also makes regular appearances in
CFAA cases. “IP Address blocking is a security measure that
prevents a connection between a specific or group of IP addresses
and a mail, web or Internet server.”
283
Websites use IP blocking to
exclude undesirable visitors.
284
Unfortunately, blocking messages
frequently provide no real information to the user. And the IP
addresses on which blocks operate can refer to multiple
computers or change over time.
285
This means that more people
than intended could get hit with a block.
286
Alternatively, visitors
can “circumvent” blocks without realizing it.
Courts generally hold that IP address blocks provide some
evidence demonstrating that users are without authorization.
287
This cuts both ways; when a website owner files a CFAA complaint
without terminating the offending accounts or blocking their IP
addresses, that indolence undermines the owners’ claims.
288
Others have been more reticent about punishing IP block
evaders. Jamie Williams at the Electronic Frontier Foundation
puts her position bluntly: “How Does Ignoring a Cease and Desist
Letter and an IP Address Block Add Up to a Computer Break-
283
IP Address Blocking, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/
3991/ip-address-blocking [https://perma.cc/FK5D-LW2B].
284
See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1168–69 (“To be sure, an IP block indicates that the
computer owner does not want at least someone at that IP address to visit the website.”).
285
See id. at 1168 (“For some users, turning on and off their modems at home
will lead their IP addresses to change.”).
286
See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1068 n.5 (9th Cir.
2016) (“[E]ven if [a blocked user] does discover the block, he could conclude that it was
triggered by misconduct by someone else who shares the same IP address, such as the
user’s roommate or co-worker.”).
287
See, e.g., Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1067 (“Facebook then imposed IP blocks
in an effort to prevent Power’s continued access. The record shows unequivocally that
Power knew that it no longer had authorization to access Facebook’s computers, but
continued to do so anyway.”); CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-39-TLS,
2017 WL 83337, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2017) (“Plaintiff alleged that . . . Defendants
knowingly and intentionally circumvented the Plaintiff ’s securitymeasures after it blocked
their access from certain cloud computing/internet service providers . . . . [This] would have
been sufficient to give the Defendants constructive notice that they were without
authorization . . . .”); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1149 (D.
Nev. 2016) (IP blocking put defendants “on notice that their conduct was improper”);
Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“Craigslist
affirmatively communicated its decision to revoke 3Taps’ access through its cease-and-
desist letter and IP blocking efforts.”); see also eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp.
2d 1058, 1062–63, 1069–70 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing repeated blocks and warnings from
eBay as supporting trespass case).
288
See Ticketmaster LLC v. Prestige Entm’t., Inc., 306 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1175–
76 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“Ticketmaster’s Complaint is wholly devoid of any allegations
suggesting that Ticketmaster took steps to prevent Defendants from future access. For
example, Ticketmaster did not allege that they shut down Defendants’ accounts or
attempted to block their IP addresses.”).
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In?”
289
This position proceeds from an incorrect assumption.
Despite its anti-hacking origins, the CFAA prohibits more than
break-ins. It prohibits access “without authorization” and it
prohibits “exceed[ing] authorized access.” But we can fairly
question whether an IP address block provides notice sufficiently
unambiguous to revoke the presumed open access inherent in
every website. Professor Orin Kerr thinks not, comparing
bypassing an IP block to “bending your neck to see around
someone who has temporarily blocked your view.”
290
This article respectfully disagrees. Certainly, an IP
address block standing alone should not suffice.
291
Often, IP blocks
never get communicated to the website user.
292
Users might see a
Connection Refused error, which can arise from numerous
innocent causes.
293
And while the website could modify the error
to something more pointed,
294
like “401 Unauthorized” or “403
Forbidden,”
295
even this might not be enough. A reasonable user
might conclude that the message is not targeted at him.
296
Given
the web’s technical realities, website owners cannot accurately
aim IP blocks at a single, static target. For example, to prevent
Aaron Swartz from downloading copyrighted journal articles,
JSTOR “block[ed] all of MIT’s access for a few days.”
297
This ban
was neither aimed at every MIT student, nor would every MIT
student be held liable for evading it. But Swartz had notice. He
next escalated his actions by breaking into a basement wiring
closet while covering his face to evade cameras.
298
IP address blocks should put others on notice. Are they
enough standing alone? No. But combined with other signals—
certainly a cease-and-desist letter, perhaps a click-thru or
prominent homepage message referring to disallowed activities—
289
Williams, supra note 169, at 429.
290
Kerr, supra note 13, at 1168.
291
Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1068 n.5 (“Simply bypassing an IP address,
without more, would not constitute unauthorized use.”).
292
See id. (“Because a blocked user does not receive notice that he has been blocked,
he may never realize that the block was imposed and that authorization was revoked.”).
293
See Sellars, supra note 261, at 405–06 (“The website might be down due to a
server error or technical bug with the user’s ISP. It might instead be due to a site-imposed
block—in which case the next attempt to load the page is grounds for CFAA liability.”).
294
See Damon, Customizing Cloudfare Error Pages, CLOUDFARE, (Aug. 28, 2019,
5:16 AM), https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/200172706-How-do-I-customize-
Cloudflare-error-pages [https://perma.cc/CS2D-ZWKM] (showing how to customize pages
appearing for IP-blocked users).
295
10 Status Code Definitions, supra note 280.
296
See Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1068 n.5 (“[E]ven if he does discover the
block, he could conclude that it was triggered by misconduct by someone else who shares
the same IP address, such as the user’s roommate or co-worker.”).
297
KERR, supra note 244, at 11.
298
See id.
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an IP block should reasonably communicate the explicit
revocation expected by trespassing precedent.
4. The Terms of Service Violator
Terms of service are the internet user’s bête noire—orwould
be, if anyone bothered to read them.
299
Courts and scholars have
regularly criticized using them as a source for CFAA de-
authorization.
300
As suggested above in discussing the use contract
approach, trespass precedents resolve this relatively easily.
301
We
should only treat trespasses as trespasses, not bad behavior.
302
Prosecute Lori Drew for harassment. Castigate her in the court of
public opinion. But she isn’t a hacker.
C. Ignoring an Owner’s Wishes
This article offers one final and controversial suggestion:
In some circumstances, trespass norms might override even an
owner’s express prohibitions. The inquisitive reader might ask
how this could happen, when the statute clearly requires
“authorization,” and the article earlier emphasized that norms
can guide but not supplant statutory text.
303
Authorization is really a conclusion that flows from the
owner’s consent, which is a tricky topic. There are actually two
kinds of consent:
Factual consent . . . is a state of the world; it exists when a person
acquiesces in conduct by another that affects her. But legal
consent . . . is a conclusion of law: it exists where the law decides to
treat a person as acquiescing in another’s conduct. Legal consent is
defined in terms of factual consent, but factual consent is neither
necessary nor sufficient for legal consent.
304
When factual consent is not necessary for legal consent—in
other words, when we ignore what the owner thinks—we still
299
See infra Section III.C.
300
See infra Section III.C.
301
See supra Section III.B.
302
See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169 (“[A] bare nonfeasance,
as not paying for the wine he calls for, will not make him a trespasser: for this is only a
breach of contract, for which the taverner shall have an action of debt or assumpsit
against him.”); Goldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 13, at 1495 (“[F]or a violation of an express
or implied prohibition on entry to constitute a criminal trespass, it must advance the
rationale for the crime of trespass.”).
303
See supra notes 175–177, 200 and accompanying text.
304
James Grimmelmann, Consenting to Computer Use, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1500, 1503 (2016).
466 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:2
have authorization. But the authorization flows from the law,
not from the owner.
305
1. The Public Protector
In rare circumstances, using a systemwithout authorization
may prevent a worse harm. The WannaCry worm provides a good
example. This particularly vicious worm spreads quickly, “locking
up critical systems like the UK’s National Health Service, a large
telecom in Spain, and other businesses and institutions around the
world.”
306
Theworm’s designers built in a kill switch; when awebsite
with a domain name composed of particular gibberish went live, the
wormwould stop propagating.
307
Withquick thinking and some luck,
a security researcher registered the domain name.
308
The worm
stopped.
309
So far so good. But what if the worm would instead stop
when a major website went down? And what if the website owner
balks? This situation seems tailor made for the necessity doctrine,
which imputes consent where required to avoid “public disaster.”
310
Indeed, the necessity defense under common law appeared to
require even less justification, explaining that “[a] personmay enter
the premises of another to save a life; to rescue an animal in danger;
to abate a nuisance; or to escape assault or injury.”
311
From its roots in the common law,
312
the necessity
doctrine has found acceptance in at least some states (though
305
See, e.g., BIGELOW, supra note 70, at 221–25 (“The term ‘license of the law’
has reference to cases in which a permission is given regardless of the will of the owner
or occupant, and includes all other cases in which the entry or taking possession was
lawful. . . . The law licenses an entry upon the land of another, or the taking possession
of another’s goods, in many cases; and in these the license cannot be revoked by the party
affected.”); 2 WATERMAN, supra note 70, at 182–83 (“There are cases where an authority
to enter is given by law; as, to execute legal process; to distrain for rent; to a landlord or
reversioner to see that his tenant does no waste, and keeps the premises in repair
according to his covenant or promise; to a creditor, to demand money payable there; or
to a person entering an inn for the purpose of getting refreshment.”).
306
Lily Hay Newman, How an Accidental ‘Kill Switch’ Slowed Friday’s Massive
Ransomware Attack, WIRED (May 13, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/accidental-
kill-switch-slowed-fridays-massive-ransomware-attack/ [https://perma.cc/6Q4X-RZRM].
307
See id.
308
See id.
309
See id.
310
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 196 (AM. LAW. INST. 1934) (“One is
privileged to enter land in the possession of another, if necessary, or if it reasonably
appears to the actor to be necessary, for the purpose of averting a public disaster.”); see
also id. § 262 (“One is privileged to use or otherwise intentionally intermeddle with a
chattel in the possession of another when such intermeddling is or is reasonably believed
to be necessary for the purpose of averting a public disaster.”).
311
ARCHER, supra note 70, at 183.
312
See, e.g., id. at 182 (“Although the law jealously guards the right of an
individual to undisturbed possession of real estate, yet there are circumstances when for
the welfare of the public the law gives permission to enter his premises, even against his
consent. This is called license of law.”).
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how many remains debatable).
313
But substantial doubt arises
about whether the federal common law has adopted a general
necessity defense. Though the Supreme Court has taken up the
issue several times, it has never squarely resolved it, and the
lower courts have split.
314
Nonetheless, assuming the defense’s
availability, the Ninth Circuit’s definition is typical, requiring a
defendant satisfy four elements: “(1) they were faced with a
choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) they acted to prevent
imminent harm; (3) they reasonably anticipated a direct causal
relationship between their conduct and the harm to be averted;
and (4) they had no legal alternatives to violating the law.”
315
A choice-of-evils analysis will necessarily depend on the
scope and severity of the worm being combated and the methods
necessary to stop it. But, takingWannaCry as an example, it is likely
the lesser evil to take down one website rather than permit a worm
to cripple national health care systems.
316
Security researchers
would act to prevent its spread and reasonably anticipate that their
actions would have that result. But they run into a roadblock with
legal alternatives. In most situations, they could negotiate with the
website owner, convince the website owner’s host or ISP to sever
their connection, or involve law enforcement. Nonetheless, one can
certainly envision circumstanceswhere a researcher could satisfy all
four elements.
Note that this approach never alters the factual definition
of “authorization.” Instead, it interposes a different doctrine—
necessity—which concludes that the perpetrator should not
receive punishment for their crime. By contrast, cyber-tenants
ejected from a system might suggest that owners can’t always
withdraw authorization at a whim.
313
See Adav Noti, Note, The Uplifted Knife: Morality, Justification, and the
Choice-of-Evils Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1859, 1861 (2003) (“Most states recognize the
justification defense in a form similar to the statutes proposed by the Model Penal Code.”
(footnote omitted)). But see Michael H. Hoffheimer, Codifying Necessity: Legislative
Resistance to Enacting Choice-of-Evils Defenses to Criminal Liability, 82 TUL. L. REV.
191, 196 (2007) (“[M]ost states do not codify the necessity defense in any form.”).
314
See Stephen S. Schwartz, Comment, Is There a Common Law Necessity
Defense in Federal Criminal Law?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (2008) (“[T]he question
of whether the [necessity] defense exists in modern federal criminal law remains an open
question. The Supreme Court has avoided deciding the question squarely, and lower
courts have addressed it inconsistently.”).
315
United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1991).
316
See Newman, supra note 306 (“WannaCry swept Europe and Asia quickly
yesterday, locking up critical systems like the UK’s National Health Service, a large telecom
in Spain, and other businesses and institutions around the world, all in record time.”).
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2. The Unjustly Ejected
One final category is the unjustly ejected cyber-tenant.
Trespass law traditionally forbids owners from using their right
to exclude to acquire another’s property. Assume, for example,
you own a set of lockers and provide the public with free use to
secure their possessions. You can bar future users and even shut
down your service, forcing current users to promptly remove their
possessions, but you can’t simply confiscate them.
317
The same
would apply to a private campground. If you invite hikers to park
their RVs, you can kick them off whenever youwant. But you can’t
use your exclusion right to prevent them from returning to the
land to claim their RVs.
318
This principle flows from several sources. First, property
ownership almost always involves the right to control that property.
As Thomas Waterman wrote in his 1875 treatise, “[t]he right of
property . . . draws after it the right of possession.”
319
To effectuate
that possessory right without infringing on the landowner’s right to
control, the law resorts to a fiction. It determines that the landowner
has consented even when the landowner insists they have done no
such thing. It does so by making irrevocable the initial license
granted by the landowner.
320
In a thoughtful and important article,
Professor James Grimmelmann links this concept of constructive
consent with CFAA authorization.
321
He explains that a system
317
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 255 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (“Upon
termination of consent to the use or occupancy of a chattel in the possession of another,
the actor is privileged to continue such use or occupancy so long as it is reasonably
necessary to safely effect egress from or discontinuance of his use of the chattel or to
remove his personal belongings therefrom.”).
318
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 177 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (“Upon
termination or suspension of consent as to the presence on land of a thing which was placed
there with the consent of the then possessor of the land to its removal thereafter, one
entitled to the immediate possession of the thing is privileged . . . to be on the land for the
purpose of removing the thing in a reasonable manner and with reasonable promptness,
unless he knew or had reason to know the time of such termination or suspension a
reasonable period in advance thereof.”); BIGELOW, supra note 70, at 221–25 (“The term
‘license of the law’ has reference to cases in which a permission is given regardless of the
will of the owner or occupant . . . . A fourth case is where goods have been placed upon a
man’s land under a tenancy . . . . [Generally,] the ownermay go upon the premises and take
them. For example: The plaintiff lets premises to the defendant at will, on the terms that
the defendant shall have reasonable time to remove his goods, after notice to quit. The
defendant enters accordingly after termination of the lease, to get his goods, against the
plaintiff ’ s refusal to allow him. This is no breach of duty.” (footnotes omitted)).
319
2 WATERMAN, supra note 70, at 207.
320
See id. at 206–07 (“[I]f the owner of personal property, by virtue of a contract
with, or the permission of the owner of land, places his property on the land, the license
to enter upon it for the purpose of removing the property, is irrevocable.”).
321
See Grimmelmann, supra note 304, at 1514 (“The most important species of
imputed consent for CFAA purposes is constructive consent, in which S is irrebuttably regarded
as having consented to conduct x by virtue of having consented to some other conduct y.”).
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owner irrebuttably consents to certain conduct, e.g., removing items,
by consenting to certain other conduct, e.g., granting access in the
first place.
322
While this idea has garnered little attention in CFAA
litigation, it seems only a matter of time, because relevant fact
patterns regularly recur. The most common seems to be the work
laptop that gets wiped.
323
If done after termination to cover up
workplace misconduct, then that might be a CFAA violation. But
what if it’s done to cover up an unfortunate but not criminal web
browsing history? While the laptop belongs to the employer, some
files on it belong to the employee.
324
Just like an employer can’t
simply confiscate the employee’s coffee mug and family photos
from the physical desk, it seems reasonable that the employee
should get an irrevocable license to clean up their personal files
from their virtual desk without risking criminal penalties.
CONCLUSION
The law has always benefited from forebears’ wisdom and
slow, incremental refinement over the centuries. Writing in 1818
on bailment law, Sir William Jones drew not only from English
sources, but Jewish, Athenian, Roman, Visigoth, ancient Briton,
and Indian.
325
As he explained: “[I]n questions of rational law, no
cause can be assigned, why we should not shorten our own labor
by resorting occasionally to the wisdom of ancient jurists, many
of whom were the most ingenious and sagacious of men.”
326
The analogies between physical and electronic trespass will
not always be perfect. But as Professor Richard Epstein suggested,
the similarities are greater than the differences, and cyberspace’s
brave new world “is neither as brave nor as new as it first
appears.”
327
The endless splits in CFAA jurisprudence have
persisted long enough. Even if Congress tried to clarify the
322
See id.
323
See, e.g., Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006).
324
If an employee has signed an explicit agreement that any files created or
placed on the laptop become the employer’s property, then obviously they would be the
employer’s property.
325
SIR WILLIAM JONES, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 12, 13, 130, 131,
132 (1818), https://books.google.com/books?id=0hgzAAAAIAAJ.
326
Id. at 16.
327
Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87–88 (2003) (“In
some circumstances we do need to modify traditional right situations to deal with new
forms of property rights. But that proposition is not some unarticulated but universal
truth. Sometimes the old analogies work just fine. So long as we keep our eye on the ball,
we do not have to be fearful of the imagined consequences that will follow by taking the
older rules of trespass and carrying them over to the brave new world of cyberspace,
which, when all is said and done, for legal purposes at least, is neither as brave nor as
new as it first appears.”).
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ambiguous statutory terms, doubt would remain about applying
the law to concrete cases.
328
It is past time to build a broad, durable
structure for future use. Trespass law provides the foundation.
Hopefully, this article has laid the first course of brick.
328
Cf. Mayer, supra note 137, at 1661 (“[R]ecognizing a distinction between
information ‘access’ and information ‘use’ does not clarify how to evaluate the scope of
authorized information ‘access.’ That analysis quickly devolves back into grasping for
substantive standards, like agency principles and contract law.”).
